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ABSTRACT 
Development of Prototype Guidelines for Risk Management Against Terror Attack in the 
Tourism Industry: A Delphi Study. (May 2006) 
Clifford Keith Smith, B.S., Texas A&M University; M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Walter F. Stenning 
 
The purpose of the study was to gather strategies and factors from tourism security 
professionals from which terrorism risk management policies can be developed.  This 
study utilized the Delphi method in order to provide structure for the group process.  
Twelve tourism security experts made up the panel completing three rounds of 
questionnaires via the email based Delphi technique. 
This research identified fifty-four strategies to reduce the propensity of terror attack at 
a tourism venue.  Those strategies were divided into four levels of priority based on 
criticality and feasibility.  The fifty-four strategies were grouped into nine subordinate 
categories.  The subordinate categories were related to Training, Communications/ 
Liaison, Planning/ Assessment, Background Checks, ID Badges/ Secure Entrance, 
Specialty Security Units, Architectural Design, Media Cooperation, and Technology 
Based strategies.  Alongside the strategies are a collection of comments by the experts 
regarding strengths, weaknesses, and any barriers to implementation pertaining to the 
individual strategy.  Tourism risk managers, security personnel, and insurance 
underwriters can all use the results in reducing the opportunity for a terrorist attack at a 
tourism venue. 
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Major research findings from this study included: 
1. The strategy receiving the highest criticality ranking over all other strategies 
involves training first responders on their role in circumventing the success of terrorists. 
2. The subordinate category Communication/ Liaison contains the largest number 
of strategies indicating the significance of this category among experts. 
3. The subordinate category of Specialty Security Units contains the second 
highest number of strategies indicating the importance of the topic among experts. 
4. All of the technology based strategies fell into the lowest priority level. 
Based on the findings of this study, researcher recommendations include:  
1. The guidelines developed in this study should be used by operators of tourism 
venues to make the best use of limited resources. 
2. National or international conferences should be established to further discuss 
these issues. 
3. A greater number of communications mediums should be established to 
facilitate the exchange of ideas and experiences between affected professionals. 
4. Insurance providers should use this information to establish validated guidelines 
so that, if prospective clients adhered to the recommendations, a reduction in premiums 
could be offered. 
5. Other entities may benefit from this study, such as public school systems, the 
energy production industry, hospital systems, and pipeline systems. 
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the World Tourism Organization estimated the industry 
generated $456 billion on an annual basis worldwide, not including travel expenses 
(Tarlow, 2001b).  Crimes against tourists, whether terrorist attacks or crimes of 
opportunity, have received international attention causing the tourism industry to 
reallocate diminishing resources toward building an image of safe travel (Muehsam, 
1996).   
In April of 2003, United States Special Forces captured fugitive terrorist Abu Abbas, 
who masterminded the 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, once again 
reminding the world of attacks on tourists.  A group called the Palestine Liberation Front, 
who held 410 passengers for two days, conducted the hijacking.  During the incident, a 
disabled American passenger named Leon Klinghoffer was shot and thrown overboard 
(“U.S. troops capture”, 2003). 
In 1997, a terrorist group called The Jimat attacked a group of tourists at the Luxor in 
Egypt.  The tourists who were murdered represented such countries as Japan, France, 
Switzerland, Germany and Great Britain.  In all, there were sixty-eight tourists killed, 
proving once again that no nationality is safe from terrorist attack (Online Newshour, 
1997).  Following the attack, noted Egyptian political analyst and former information 
minister in the Egyptian Foreign Service, Mohammad Wahby, stated, “They target   
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tourists because this is the way which they think they can hit the government very, very 
hard.  Tourism in Egypt is one of the biggest sources of revenues, and by depriving Egypt 
of this, they shake the very economic foundation of Egypt” (Online Newshour, 1997, 
p.2). 
In October 2002, the bombing of a Bali nightclub killed 202 people, mostly foreign 
tourists, in the worst terrorist attack since the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York 
and Washington.  The group responsible was the al Qaeda-linked terror group Jemaah 
Islamiyah (“Bali bomb plotter, 2003).  In the aftermath, Bali’s economy has lost hundreds 
of millions of dollars in tourist revenue (“Bali bomb lawyers”, 2003). 
Since tourists are free to choose their destination, a tourism location that becomes 
associated with terrorism can face a serious economic crisis.  Therefore, in order to 
protect their image, tourist destinations should include crisis management as a part of the 
overall marketing/ management strategy (Sonmez, 1999). 
Each segment of the tourism industry has its own individual and unique security 
concerns, but there may be areas of concern that are common among the various tourism 
sectors.  This study will make an effort to identify commonalities in order to create a base 
from which to address terrorism risk management for the tourism industry. 
Statement of the Problem 
There is no set of guidelines to which the tourism industry can refer that would assist 
in the reduction of propensity for risk and loss due to terrorist attacks. A considerable 
foundation of knowledge has been produced in the literature regarding risk management; 
however, little is available specific to terrorism risk management in the tourism industry.  
The majority of research information on terrorism risk management has been developed 
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from personal contact with those individuals who are considered professionals within the 
tourism security field from a national as well as an international perspective.  Those in 
the tourism industry, especially those countries vulnerable to politically motivated 
violence and those whose economic stability depends on tourism, need some guidance in 
order to reduce the risks involved with the tourism industry.  This auspicious task begs 
for cooperation from a variety of professionals in order to develop practical guidelines for 
terrorism risk management professionals. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study is to gather strategies and factors from tourism security 
professionals in order to formulate guidelines from which terrorism risk management 
policies can be developed.  The researcher will attempt to correlate views and opinions 
regarding terrorism risk management and to allow respondents to react to and examine 
opposing viewpoints.  The study shall put forth all possible options for consideration by 
individual, corporate, and agency policy makers.  To provide further detail, an estimate of 
impact and consequences of any particular option as well as examination of the 
acceptability of any particular option shall be sought.  The purpose of this study is NOT 
to make decisions for policy makers, but rather, to provide all available options presented 
by an informed group for consideration by policy makers. 
Limitations and Assumptions 
Risk management in general deals with topics ranging from financial risk 
management to accident prevention.  The scope of this research shall encompass those 
areas of concern that may reduce the opportunity for or provide deterrence to a terror 
attack.   
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The major assumption involved with this study is the continuance of terrorism and its 
effects on travel and tourism.  Daily updates from the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security on the level of threat directed at United States and its interests seem to indicate 
that this. 
Subject areas of risk management to be studied include, but are not limited to, risk 
assessment, emergency planning, response, and recovery.  Additional ancillary matters 
would include relationships between the private sector and the public safety entities, 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), use of tabletop exercises for 
evaluation purposes, and hiring practices in the private sector including background 
checks.  
There are several preempted segments of the Tourism Industry, which by the nature 
of their particular service, already have security models in place.  Those would be the 
airline industry, the rail transport industry, and the cruise line industry.  Also, 
governmental public safety entities are preempted because they are supposed to be in the 
business of risk management to the extent that they are trained in critical incident 
management and responsible for the preplanning of events within their perspective 
jurisdictions.  The research plan for this study shall not consider the aforementioned as 
end users. 
The end users of this research model shall be those in the Tourism Industry that 
operate within confined facilities such as, sporting arenas, convention halls, and theme 
parks.  It is important in this work to create a list or “breakdown” of the major segments 
within the tourism industry that are affected by security threats or that can benefit from 
the research.  A quick look provides the following list of potential end users: 
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1. Hotel/ Motel Industries 
2. Transcontinental Busing Industry 
3. Private Security Forces 
4. Theme Parks and Major Attraction Parks 
5. Sporting Event Hosts 
6. Travel Agencies 
7. Conference Centers 
Research Questions 
1. What are the needs of the Tourism Industry to reduce the risk of terrorist attack? 
2. What are the solutions to the stated needs? 
3. What are the barriers to the stated solutions?  
4. What are the prototype guidelines to apply the solutions to the stated needs? 
Definition of Terms 
The following operational definitions will be utilized throughout the course of this 
research. 
A background check is a process in which the specifics of an individual's past are 
revealed for the purposes of employment, obtaining access to classified information, or 
access to restricted areas. 
CBRNE is the acronym for chemical, biological, radiological/ nuclear, explosive. 
CPTED is the acronym Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (Tarlow, 
2002). 
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Contemporary Threat Management or CTM postulates that there is a connection 
between a specific set of behaviors in which the perpetrator engages prior to the violent 
act directed at the victim (Calhoun & Weston, 2003). 
DHS stands for the United States Department of Homeland Security created after the 
attacks of 911. 
DOI stands for the United States Department of Interior. 
Tourism Crisis is any occurrence which can threaten the normal operation and 
conduct of tourism related businesses; damage a tourist destination’s overall reputation 
for safety, attractiveness, and comfort by negatively affecting visitors’ perceptions of that 
destination; and, in turn, cause a downturn in the local travel and tourism economy, and 
interrupt the continuity of business operations for the local travel and tourism industry, by 
the reduction in tourist arrivals and expenditures (Sonmez, 1997). 
Risk Assessment is the systematic examination of hazards and the potential for the 
risks arising to cause harm (Glendon, 1995). 
Risk Management is the technique of applying known methods of dealing with the 
problem of risk in a more effective and more ordered form and to devise new or 
improved methods of minimizing loss (Crockford, 1980). 
Terrorism is the calculated employment or the threat of violence by individuals, sub-
national groups, and state actors to attain political, social, and economic objectives in the 
violation of law (Alexander, 2002). 
WTTC is the World Travel and Tourism Council; an international organization of 
travel industry executives promoting travel and tourism worldwide.  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Defining Terrorism 
“Terrorism is often defined as indiscriminate destruction of property and life for the 
purposes of furthering a political agenda” (Tarlow, 2002, p. 133).  Benjamin Netanyahu, 
former Prime Minster of Israel, describes terrorism as “the deliberate and systematic 
assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends” (2001, p. 8).  He further expands his 
definition by broadening the meaning of “political ends” to include ideological or 
religious motives.  The essence of terrorism is the attack of the innocent who are in no 
way involved in legitimate conflict.  The farther the victim is from the cause of the 
terrorists, then the greater the amount of terror inflicted (Netanyahu, 2001).  Meltzer 
describes terrorism as a policy of intimidation.  In other words, it is the “exploitation of a 
state of intense fear, caused by the systematic use of violent means by a party of group, to 
get into power or to maintain power” (Meltzer, 1983, p. 6).   
More important than finding a definition that encompasses all aspects of terrorism is 
the understanding of the phenomenon.  Groups that are in some varying degree supported 
by nation-states and inspired by religious, nationalistic, or political zealotry will use any 
means to accomplish their goals, including the use of suicide and mass murder as a 
weapon.  Their objective is to attract attention to their cause and to terrorize their enemies 
into submission (Dershowitz, 2002). 
Terrorism vs. Criminal Activity 
Terrorists are willing to give their lives in pursuit of media attention.  Criminals, unlike 
terrorists, wish to avoid attention.  Rather, they seek profit and see their activity at 
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tourism events as work.  Terrorists seek media attention as a tool to induce political 
chaos.  Therefore, any tourist attraction is a potential target for terrorists.  This trend 
differentiates criminal activity and terrorism as two different antisocial behaviors.  Table 
1 relates the differences between criminal activity and terrorism.  Risk managers in the 
tourism industry must understand the differences as they now face new challenges in 
dealing with the possibility of terror attacks (Tarlow, 2002).   
Table 1 
Major Differences Between Event Crime and Terrorism 
 Crime Terrorism 
Goal Usually economic or social 
gain 
To gain publicity and 
sometimes sympathy for a 
cause 
Usual type of victim Person may be known to 
the perpetrator or selected 
because he or she may 
yield economic gain 
Killing is random and 
appears to be more in line 
with a stochastic model; 
numbers may or may not 
be important 
Defenses in use Often reactive, reports 
taken 
Some proactive devices 
such as radar detectors 
Political ideology Usually none  Robin Hood model, that is 
to say, the terrorist sees 
himself in a positive light 
Publicity Usually local and rarely 
makes the international 
news 
Almost always is broadcast 
around the world 
Most common forms in 
events industry are: 
Crimes of distraction 
Robbery 
Sexual Assault 
Domestic terrorism 
International terrorism 
Bombings 
Potential for biochemical 
attack 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 Crime Terrorism 
Statistical accuracy Often very low; in many 
cases, the travel and 
tourism industry does 
everything possible to hide 
the information 
Almost impossible to hide; 
numbers are reported with 
great accuracy and repeated 
often 
Length of negative 
effects on the local 
events industry 
In most cases, it is short 
term 
In most cases, it is long 
term, unless replaced by 
new positive image 
Recovery strategies  New marketing plans, 
assumes short-term 
memory of traveling 
public 
 Probability ideals: “odds 
are it will not happen to 
you” 
 Hide information as best 
as one can 
 Showing of compassion 
 Need to admit the 
situation and demonstrate 
control 
 Higher levels of observed 
security 
 Highly trained (in 
tourism, terrorism, and 
customer service) 
security personnel 
 
Trends in Terrorism 
In the late 1980’s, terrorism had become somewhat subdued both internationally and 
in Western countries.  Terrorism has now returned in new forms and with great ferocity.  
The new modus operandi has been demonstrated by the use of chemicals to attack in the 
heart of the Japanese.  The bombing of subways began in Paris after nearly a decade of 
silenced terrorist activity.  Rather than hostage taking, terrorists are resorting to bombing 
their target.  In the 1980’s, the punishment and sanctions handed out to hostage takers 
and their supporters deterred their overt acts and now terrorists attempt to avoid 
punishment by living deep and undetected within a society (Netanyahu, 2001). 
In his comparative study of counter terrorism, Alexander states:  
There is an apparent trend toward more lethal and massive terrorist attacks.  
Modern terrorists are increasingly motivated by hatred, revenge, and religious and 
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cult fanaticism.  They are less constrained by the rational political calculus that 
has influenced most terrorists in the past and that limited mass killing.  Above all, 
U.S. officials fear that terrorists with these inclinations, both domestic and 
international, may acquire and use increasingly available materials of mass 
destruction - biological, chemical, and radiological - to carry out unprecedented 
mass-casualty terrorism (2001, p.26). 
From a historical perspective, terrorism started as a retail venture.  Assassinations of 
individuals and ambushes or bombings on a small scale are examples.  Moving into the 
modern era, terrorism is now planned on the wholesale scale.  Now, weapons of mass 
destruction provide choices to terrorists so that large-scale damage is a real threat and can 
be used to strike fear and seek attention.  Terrorists can now use small personnel numbers 
to achieve huge results, as evidenced by the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Alexander, 
2001). 
The intense media coverage of terror attacks gives the impression that terrorism is a 
successful method to achieve the goals of the terrorist.  Rarely are the failures of the 
terrorist reported in the media; only the successful, horrific events receive recognition.  
Also, the international community has shown a weakness to condemn terrorists.  As a 
result, aggrieved groups have found that terrorism is an attractive method to affect change 
(Alexander, 2001). 
The Madrid, Spain bombing provides an example of such strategies.  The Popular 
Party of Spain has been a steadfast supporter of President Bush’s foreign policy.  The 
bombing of the subway system just days before Spain’s general election lead to a surprise 
victory for the Socialist Party, which in turn denounced President Bush’s policies and 
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removed their troops from Iraq.  The weakening of the Spanish government against 
terrorism has sent the message that terrorist attack is now a viable strategy in which to 
influence elections, thus making terrorism an effective form of policy.  The Spanish 
population sent a message by changing support for the other party, thus giving credence 
to terrorism as a successful strategy (Marquardt, 2003). 
In 1994, the Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict conducted a 
study on the future of terrorism.  Almost ninety-five percent of the projections from the 
study have been correct.  Those projections included the rise in terrorism by religious 
fanatics, a bombing in mid-America by domestic terrorists, an attack on the World Trade 
Center by Muslims, and the possibility of a hijacked plane used to target the Pentagon or 
White House.  The study also predicts that New York, Washington, and Las Vegas will 
be the three major targets of terrorists.  Because of the trends, the hospitality industry will 
be one of the hardest hit and should prepare itself against such attacks (Goss, 2003).   
A federal commission headed by formers Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman 
came to these conclusions about terrorism in September 1999: 
 The most serious threat to our security may consist of unannounced attacks on 
American cities by terrorist groups using germ warfare. 
 Another threat may be a well-planned cyber-attack on the East Coast’s air 
traffic control system as some 200 commercial aircraft are trying to land 
safely in a morning’s rain and fog. 
 U.S. forces will be increasingly involved in humanitarian missions in trouble 
spots around the world, fueling resentment toward us. 
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 In one of its grimmest predictions, the report said that, “Americans will likely 
die on American soil, possible in large numbers (“National security”, 2005). 
We can no longer ignore the fact that terrorists are able to attack on a large scale 
within the borders of the United States.  They have demonstrated their ability to become 
more sophisticated in terms of capability and synchronization.  Terrorists study the 
weaknesses of the physical protection of our establishments so as to impart the greatest 
impact of an attack (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003). 
Tourism as a Target 
With the trends in terrorism to increase both the number and size of attacks, there is 
an obvious connection between tourism and terrorism.  Tarlow provides some reasons for 
the interaction between terrorism and tourist events: 
 Events are often close to major transportation centers. 
 Events are big business. 
 Events impact other industries such as restaurants, hotels, and entertainment. 
 Events often draw media coverage. 
 Events require tranquility or places where business can be conducted in a 
peaceful manner. 
 Events must deal with people who have no history; thus, risk managers often 
do not have databases on delegates or attendees. 
 Events are based on a constant flow of guests; thus, it is hard to know who is 
and who is not a terrorist. 
 Events are the point where business and relaxation converge, and therefore 
guests often let down their guard (Tarlow, 2002, p. 135). 
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Because the tourism industry is worth billions and receives vast media attention, it 
should consider itself a high profile target for terrorism.  If the large amount of money 
involved is not enough to realize being a target, then consider these political reasons: 
Tourism is attacked by terrorists for a number of reasons:  firstly because it is seen to 
be symbolic of capitalism; secondly, tourists represent western oppressive regimes; and 
thirdly, by attacking state-sponsored tourism, terrorism is seen as a way to influence 
political behavior (Gold, 2001). 
The El’Gama fundamentalist group was motivated by these very same views when 
they attacked the Luxor in Egypt in 1997 killing fifty-eight tourists and brining Egyptian 
tourism to a halt (Gold, 2001).  When tourists are specified as the target of an attack, 
there are two different reasons.  The terrorists see the tourist as the symbol of the sending 
country or as part of the economic system of the host country.  In the first case, as 
representatives of another country, it is much easier to distinguish the threatened group of 
people.  In the latter case, it is much more difficult to identify potential victims as 
tourists, foreign or domestic (Glaesser, 2003). 
Terrorism almost certainly carries a political message.  Publicity is the goal in order 
to get that political message out.  The higher the profile of an event, the more media 
attention it will receive.  Tourism being a high profile industry must recognize itself as a 
target for terrorism (Tarlow, 2002). 
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The Economics of Security 
The connection between tourism’s money-making ability and the concept of security 
are undeniable.  The perceptions tourists have of a travel location’s management of safety 
and security strongly affect their behavior and decisions about destinations.  Furthermore, 
concerns about travel safety in general have shown that the tourism industry is vulnerable 
to changes in the global security environment.  When a security concern arises, a ripple 
effect can occur.  If a location is perceived as unsafe, that perception can spread to an 
entire region or even the entire tourism system (Hall, 2003). 
“Between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2002 estimated losses in tourism 
revenue for U.S. cities and metropolitan areas totaled $12.5 billion” (Hall, 2003, p. 41).  
“Not since the Gulf War has there been such a downturn in the travel and tourism market 
as has been caused by the terrorist attack on September 11” (Hall, 2003, p. 83) 
History shows the reaction of tourists to terrorist activity.  Of the 28 million 
Americans who traveled abroad in 1985, 162 were killed or injured during terrorist 
activity.  That is a probability of less than .00057% of becoming a terrorist’s victim.  
Despite this low probability, in 1986 two-million Americans changed their international 
travel plans due to the previous year’s terrorist activity.   
A 1986 Gallop Poll revealed that 79% of Americans said they would decline foreign 
travel due to terrorism.  The World Tourism Organization posits that in 1985, there was a 
loss of $105 billion of US currency on an international level due to terrorism.  During the 
Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. Department of State recorded 275 terrorist incidents, which 
influenced international travel flows.  Throughout the 1990’s, countries across the globe 
experienced economic loss due to terrorism (Sonmez, 1999).  The 2001 attacks on the 
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World Trade Center and the Pentagon are yet another reminder that political conflict and 
terrorism will endure. 
More current information shows this trend to continue.  A Harris poll conducted in 
April of 2003 among over two thousand adults reveals millions of people have decided to 
avoid traveling, fly less, and spend less time away from home due to terrorism.  Fifty-six 
percent stated that travel risks for Americans outside the United States are worse than 
before the attacks of 9/11.  Seventeen percent (which would equate to thirty-five million 
people) said their vacation plans were affected by the Iraq war and terrorism.  Twelve 
percent decided to do less flying within the United States.  Ten percent decided to stay 
home more.  Six percent changed their vacation destination.  And seven percent decided 
not to travel at all (Taylor, 2003). 
The impact on the travel and tourism industries has been severe.  The damage to the 
air industry has been greater than to any other sector and remains vulnerable.  The 
implementation of security measures will be costly, yet unavoidable in order to restore 
tourists’ confidence levels (Safe Democracy Foundation, 2005).  Tourists are willing to 
accept a certain level of risk when making travel decisions.  The amount of risk is greatly 
influence by the “credibility of the affected organization” (Glaesser, 2003, p. 56).  
Therefore, methods or strategies to deal with the relationship between tourism and 
terrorism are essential for the protection of life and economic prosperity for those who 
depend on the tourism industry. 
In May of 1998, the 7th Annual Las Vegas Tourism Security Conference was held 
during which several themes emerged.   
  Tourism protection requires joint partnerships.  The partnerships 
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include all aspects of the security and safety industries, 
government, hotel managers, tourism agencies and offices; 
 Tourism crime is an expense that the tourism industry can ill 
afford; 
 There is a need for greater applied research into all aspects of 
crimes against tourists; 
 Tourism must come to understand that it risks its industry viability 
if it flees from the problems of safety; 
 Tourism safety cannot be handled solely on a local basis, it must 
be confronted on a national and international level; 
 The need for security professionals and academics to network 
together and to exchange ideas on a continual basis (Tarlow, 2000, 
p. 2). 
The May 2000 conference yielded similar themes showing a trend that is continuing.  
At the conference Dr. Peter Tarlow (2001a) stated,  “As tourism continues to grow, it is 
essential that the industry work hard to create a safe and secure environment in which 
safety and security issues are examined thoroughly and in a scientific manner.  Tourism 
safety and security are too important not to be the subjects of the best academic and 
professional research” (p. 1). 
“Experts indicate that terrorism will continue to victimize soft targets, attacks will 
become more indiscriminate, terrorism will become institutionalized as a method of 
armed conflict, it will spread geographically and the public will witness more terrorism 
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than ever due to the media’s improved ability to cover terrorist incidents” (Sonmez, 1999, 
p. 3). 
The vast contribution of tourism to the economy is so large that any disruptions in the 
industry are cause for concern.  Any economic downturn extends beyond the tourism 
industry itself to include airlines, hotels and catering, and to businesses that supply 
intermediate or final goods which tourists purchase.  In other words, virtually all facets of 
the economy are affected (Essner, 2003). 
Tourists’ Perceptions 
The tourism industry is highly sensitive to sudden economic events and perceived 
danger can be catastrophic for the industry.  Thus, perceived safety is the dominant 
factor for its continued growth.  Fixed locations such as hotels, convention centers, 
restaurants, and theme parks are the most vulnerable to attack.  Risk of terror attack is 
now a long-term implication of the tourism industry that must be dealt with to ensure 
patron confidence (Gold, 2003).  Following the Bali bombing of 2002, tourist arrivals 
to that location fell forty percent (LaMoshi, 2003).  According to Travel Industry 
Association research prior to the 9/11 attacks, fifteen percent of tourists view safety 
as the most important facet of travel.  Even companies have restricted travel of 
employees due to safety concerns.  Based on this research and since the 9/11 attacks, 
Disneyland moved swiftly to add security measures such as increased security patrols, 
patron inspections at the gate, limiting the number of access points, and tighter ID 
controls.  Now, Orange County California law enforcement agencies meet with 
convention planners, hotel operators and tour operators to discuss security issues and 
provide bomb-sniffing dogs for security enhancement (Cain, 2002). 
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To illustrate the power of perception, terrorists now realize they can have an 
effect on people with mere threats, thus providing them with a pseudo psychological 
victory.  Government officials must also be mindful of comments that can be 
exaggerated and cause increased fear unnecessarily.  The media plays a huge role in 
perception with sensationalism of reporting (Alexander, 2002). 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the airline industry moved to instill confidence in the 
traveling public.  A step up in security to bring back positive perception was 
accomplished through implementing surveillance cameras in public view, performing 
background checks on employees and passengers, along with other activities openly 
seen by the public (Hall, 2003).  There are two overall strategies that can be effective 
in creating a safe atmosphere for tourism.  The first is a passive approach that is 
comprised of hardening of potential terrorist targets through increased security 
personnel, more stringent patron scrutiny, and the implementation of on-site security 
systems.  The second is an active approach that involves the use of overwhelming law 
enforcement technologies such as the monitoring of groups associated with terrorism, 
pooling and analyzing intelligence information, preemptive surveillance, search and 
seizure, interrogation, detention, and prosecution when plans for attack are discovered 
(Netanyahu, 2001). 
In order to counter the threat of terrorism and to put minds at ease, the World 
Travel & Tourism Council based in the United Kingdom announced that it has 
developed a Security Action Plan.  The purpose was to publicly announce initiatives 
to be implemented by the tourism industry stating that experience shows that once an 
immediate threat has lifted, people’s enthusiasm to travel rapidly returns.  The 
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approach is to develop a foundation of practical measures that can be utilized to 
reduce the effects of terrorism, including the convincing of the public that the tourism 
industry must accept the risk of terrorism and is attempting to reduce that risk (Travel 
& tourism, 2003). 
World Travel & Tourism Council 
In an initiative to reach out to the entire industry, the World Travel & Tourism 
Council (WTTC) announced the development of the Travel & Tourism Security 
Action Plan in which they state the responsibility of security is primarily that of the 
government.  However, the private sector can play an important role in the protection 
of customers and employees.  The WTTC plan calls for cooperation among all 
stakeholders, both public and private, and effective relationships meaning there 
should be no rivalry between competitors when it comes to security issues.  “Security 
is a strictly non-competitive issue and requires stakeholders to work together, 
adhering to the general guidelines promoted through this Action Plan and sharing 
crucial information freely with each other” (Travel & tourism, 2003, p. 4).  “A 
comprehensive set of working principles and operating measures are outlined in the 
plan, which collectively provide a frame of reference, helping to guide the 
development of security initiatives across all sectors of the industry and government” 
(Travel & tourism, 2003, p. 4).  There are four key principles of the WTTC’s Security 
Action Plan. 
1. Coordinate all policy, actions and communications.  This will help create a 
spirit of cooperation among all employees, working partners and other 
stakeholders, as well as integrating security into all policy and operational 
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areas.  It is important that relationships between stakeholders are established 
at the earliest opportunity and are constantly maintained.  The public sector is 
responsible for ensuring that effective conduits of communication are 
established for security coordination (Travel & tourism, 2003, p. 5). 
2. Secure operating environments.  It is a government responsibility to identify 
and highlight areas of security concern within national borders and to set the 
broad criteria when establishing measures appropriate for general and specific 
threats.  The basis of creating a secure environment lies in the development of 
a sound security plan. Every enterprise must have its own security plan, which 
must never be a direct template transferred from one scenario to another. 
Although many of the procedures and much of the terminology may be the 
same – and can and should be replicated for commonality of practice and ease 
of communication (Travel & tourism, 2003, p. 7). 
3. Aim to deny terrorists freedom of action.  Travel & Tourism enterprises must 
make contact with and engage as wide a cross section of the host community 
as possible, including those not directly affected by their operations.  Without 
engagement – winning hearts and minds beyond the immediate confines of an 
enterprise - managers will have little feel for the prevailing regional and local 
ground currents, which are likely to be the first indicators of an increased 
threat.  It is essential that industry stakeholders institute a system for assessing 
whether potential employees are likely to prove security risks (Travel & 
tourism, 2003, p. 9). 
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4. Access and work with the best intelligence.  The gathering of intelligence, 
defined as the processing of raw data into usable information, must be subject 
to constant review and amendment as new information is received. It is best 
described, therefore, as a cycle: collection, processing, dissemination, and 
direction.  The Travel & Tourism industry must develop a coordinated and 
structured approach to meet each of these four stages, exploiting to the full 
areas of internal strength, notably its in built capacity for the collection of 
local intelligence, and referring to the public sector in areas of weakness, such 
as the processing of that information (Travel & tourism, 2003, p. 9). 
Regardless of the blurred lines of responsibility between the private and public 
sectors, the private sector has the responsibility of protecting customers and 
employees.  The stifling of cooperation among all stakeholders can only impede 
progress for the greater good.  The WTTC plan provides for an initiative to develop 
broad security plans among all sectors of tourism allowing each entity to decide the 
details best suited for their own environment.  The four key components to consider 
are coordination, secure environments, denying freedom of action to terrorists and use 
of the best intelligence. 
Department of Homeland Security 
In contrast to the plan put forth by the WTTC and as part of an overarching strategy 
to mobilize and organize the nation in protecting against terrorist attack, in 2003 the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published, “The National Strategy for the 
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.”  This was an effort to 
facilitate the strategic planning process amongst the private and public sectors. 
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In this eighty-two page document, many different industries and entities are 
discussed; however, the tourism industry as a whole is not mentioned.  In fact, there is 
only one mention of tourism in the entire document.  When deciding key assets, our 
national monuments are designated to a category of their own.  “The sites and structures 
that make up this key asset category typically draw large amounts of tourism and frequent 
media attention – factors that impose additional protection challenges” (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, p.71). 
Though the tourism industry is not specifically mentioned in the document, the theme 
of safeguarding against terror attacks is congruent with this study.  The DHS states its 
eight guiding principles in the development of the national strategy: 
1. Assure public safety, public confidence, and services; 
2. Establish responsibility and accountability; 
3. Encourage and facilitate partnering among all levels of government and 
between government and industry; 
4. Encourage market solutions wherever possible and compensate for market 
failure with focused government intervention; 
5. Facilitate meaningful information sharing; 
6. Foster international cooperation; 
7. Develop technologies and expertise to combat terrorist threats; and 
8. Safeguard privacy and constitutional freedoms (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2003, p. ix). 
The tourism industry has little influence on security agendas although security 
agendas have far reaching affects on tourism (Hall, 2003).  Yet, few tourist attractions are 
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ready to combat the threat of terrorism (Tarlow, 2002).  The Department of Homeland 
Security posits that the private sector, which would include tourism, is its own first line 
of defense.  Therefore, those operating in the private sector must continually reassess and 
adjust action plans in order to address the increased risk presented by deliberate acts of 
terrorism (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003).   
Clearly, the DHS views its role as that of an information gathering and sharing entity.  
Their approach to security for the private sector is to encourage overall goals and 
objectives for each organization to strive to accomplish.  Their position is that the 
country’s assets are vast and highly complex and if they concentrate all efforts on one 
sector, then the terrorists will focus on targets that are less protected.  Therefore the 
federal government will work with state and local governments and the private sector to 
develop methodology to focus on high-priority activities and approaches to counter the 
threat of terror attack.  A stated objective is to assure protection of targets that face an 
imminent threat.  A clear example is the threat of terrorism that the tourism industry must 
recognize as a threat.  It should be noted that tourism is not mentioned as part of the 
government’s overall plan, but that the private sector must collaborate and cooperate 
within itself to provide focused protection against the anticipated threat (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2003). 
The comprehensive approach begins with the availability of relevant expertise and 
access to affordable tools and best practices that will encourage the private sector to take 
immediate action at all levels of the risk management component.  Thus, the coordinating 
of information dissemination between the government and the tourism industry is of 
utmost importance for effective decision-making.  It is imperative to have in place 
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processes and systems for communication and exchange of crucial security-related 
information among the private sector operators establishing a foundation for cooperation 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003). 
Regarding personnel issues, the DHS provides four areas that employers must 
address.  First, employers must prevent an insider from conducting sabotage.  That means 
not only employees, but also anyone who has access such as contractors, outsourced 
service providers, and even temporary help.  Second, recruit and train more skilled 
personnel to protect assets.  Security personnel must be trustworthy, reliable, and 
properly trained.  Third, ensure personnel are secure in the work place to do their jobs.  
And finally implement communication programs to manage risk in a constructive 
manner.  A culture of protection awareness is very effective in the workplace where 
everyone is on guard for a terrorist attack (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2003). 
While ongoing research and development is contributing the latest technologies to 
combat terrorism, the DHS assigns responsibility to the private sector for identifying 
standards, tools, and processes to establish research priorities.  The challenge for the 
tourism industry is for individual stakeholders to identify commonality among needs and 
coordinate research and development activities that will produce the greatest return in the 
interest of all (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003). 
In the document, the DHS places a great emphasis on modeling, simulation, and 
analysis as a means to evaluate the risks of a particular vulnerability and make better 
decisions regarding protection.  As a real-time decision tool, scenario training can help 
reduce the effects of a terror attack and prevent secondary attacks.  The private sector has 
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a long history of dealing with natural disasters, but a lack of experience in planning and 
contending with the threat of terrorism.  Since no long-term historical data is available to 
evaluate patterns or behaviors, no evidence exists as to which strategies would be most 
effective in deterring terror attacks (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003).   
Demand for studies in this area will be great and priorities among projects will need 
to be established to give the most common benefits and recognize the greatest threats and 
vulnerabilities.  This includes an effort to enhance data collection and standardization.  
Data related to protection strategies may not exist, be accessible, or be available in a 
standardized format  These processes, systems and standards will need to be created so 
model data sets can be utilized (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003). 
The approach of the DHS in defense of national monuments against terror attacks can 
easily be transposed to address the same concerns within the tourism industry.  The large 
attraction associated with national monument sites makes apparent the potential for 
human loss resulting from terrorism.  A proactive approach in protection of these 
facilities is important regarding human life as well as preserving public confidence.  To 
address concerns, the DHS specifies numerous initiatives that the Department of Interior 
(DOI) shall implement in the protection of sites. 
 Define criticality criteria for national monuments, icons, and symbols.  DOI 
will work in concert with DHS to develop specific guidance to define criteria 
and standards for determining the criticalities and protection priorities for our 
national monuments, icons, and symbols. 
 Conduct threat and vulnerability assessments.  DOI will work in concert with 
DHS and other appropriate authorities to conduct threat and vulnerability 
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assessments to identify gaps in visitor protection processes as well as asset 
protection. 
 Retain a quality security force.  DOI will explore alternatives to foster efforts 
to recruit, train, and retain a skilled and motivated security force. 
 Conduct security-focused public outreach and awareness programs.  DOI will 
enlist public support in the protection of our national icons and symbols 
through sustained public outreach and awareness programs. 
 Collaborate with state and local governments and private foundations to 
assure the protection of symbols and icons outside the federal domain.  DOI 
will work with state and local governments and private institutions to explore 
alternatives to protect symbols and icons such as historical buildings and 
landmarks that are outside the purview of the federal government. 
 Evaluate innovative technologies.  DOI, in concert with DHS and other key 
stakeholders, will explore ways to employ security technologies to ensure the 
protection of visitors to monuments and other like attractions. 
 Make provisions for extra security during high-profile events.  DOI will work 
with law enforcement agencies to manage visitor periods at national 
monuments and provide extra security during high-profile events taking place 
in or around national icons (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003, p. 
33).   
The DHS insists that terrorist can and will attack the United States.  The vast 
majority of the complex and diverse target sets within the U.S. are controlled by the 
private sector.  It is imperative that the comprehensive strategies put forth by the 
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Department of Homeland Security be implemented.  The DHS states they will be 
working to identify options to compensate those in the private sector for 
implementing security enhancements as an incentive to be proactive.  That means 
rewarding those in their industry for being leaders on security issues (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2003). 
The WTTC and the DHS have both stated the vast need in planning strategies to 
thwart terrorism where populations are attracted to congregate.  Calhoun and Weston 
(2003) provide a model for proactive prediction of human violence.  This body of 
literature makes clear the need to be proactive in the endeavor to protect against 
terrorism.  What is lacking in the literature is information on detailed strategies that 
are effective and feasible to be utilized by the tourism industry.  To obtain such 
information, subject matter experts (SME’s) must be queried and the process of data 
collection, analysis and dissemination put into action for the private sector.  Clearly it 
has been stated the sharing of information and cooperation uninhibited by 
competition is paramount. 
Contemporary Threat Management 
After studying countless cases of intended violence directed at an array of individuals 
and groups, Calhoun and Weston developed the concept of contemporary threat 
management (2003).  Their work establishes a link, not among the targets, but in the fact 
that violence was intended by the perpetrators against those targets.  Professions 
involving human interactions cannot ignore experiences drawn from contemporary threat 
management.  Research information is too vast for anyone to hide behind the excuse of 
ignorance. 
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Contemporary threat management posits those intended on committing violence 
exhibit a set of recognizable behaviors.  This includes perpetrators who target 
individuals because of who they are or what they represent.  The cornerstone of their 
work is the repetitive observations of experienced employees who recognized patterns 
of behavior in individuals leading up to violent acts.  Throughout their work, Calhoun 
and Weston (2003) demonstrate that a proactive approach to reducing threat is the 
most effective model.   
A vast historical body of research exists on intended human violence.  From 
school shootings to public figure assassinations, the researchers have covered the 
gamut.  No practical advice was born out of the research in the way of recognizing 
signs of intended violence prior to the act.  Impractical research offered little use to 
law enforcement in identifying, assessing, and managing those approaching a violent 
intent.  Such inept research produced results that noted domestic abusers often took 
hostages.  Law enforcement waiting for a hostage situation is completely reactive and 
unproductive.  The purpose of the threat management process is to provide tools for 
identifying, assessing, and managing individuals before the violent act occurs 
(Calhoun & Weston, 2003). 
Actuarial tables are sophisticated client profiles used by insurance companies to 
accurately predict risk among certain groups of individuals.  Actuarial profiles allow 
insurance companies to turn a profit in that high risk groups have higher premiums to 
offset the cost of claims.  In law enforcement terms, actuarial tables are synonymous 
with criminal profiling.  This is not helpful to threat managers because there are built 
in expectations and generalities that can cause individual case evidence to be 
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overlooked.  For example, the D.C. sniper case profile experts in the media told the 
public that the sniper would turn out to be a lone white male in his thirties who had 
relationship issues with women, had a military background, and had been fired from a 
craft/ hobby store.  Of course it turned out to be two black males many years apart in 
age.  The one with a military background was not the shooter.  The rest of the 
espoused profile was inaccurate. Attempts to use profiles are dangerous causing 
specifics to the case to be overlooked (Calhoun & Weston, 2003). 
The Calhoun and Weston model is based on behaviors of the violent perpetrator.  
Behaviors assessed as a whole on a two way path, up or down the behavior escalator 
that can result in a violent act.  The model requires the continued monitoring of an 
individual’s actions which in turn provides threat managers with a set of predictive 
indicators (Calhoun & Weston, 2003). 
Although the threat management process has a place in the tourism industry, 
what’s important to note for the present study is the recognition that a proactive 
approach to violence is most effective in protection of life. 
Delphi Approach to Research 
In order to obtain and describe the sought information from subject matter experts 
who are separated by geographical distance; a Delphi research model can be 
effective.  The legitimacy of the Delphi for conducting research in this study shall be 
discussed in this section.  Also, a description of its structure will explain the 
appropriateness of the Delphi as a method of research for the research questions of 
this present study. 
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In the early 1950’s, the Rand Corporation conducted a study sponsored by the Air 
Force entitled “Project Delphi.”  The purpose of the study was to obtain a consensus 
of opinion among experts through the use of questionnaires built on top of one 
another with controlled feedback features (Linstone & Turoff, 1979).  Subsequently, 
various fields of study have taken advantage of the Delphi method to develop policy 
and planning, determine the future structure of hospitals, and determine scenarios 
most likely to occur in social services and healthcare (Adler & Ziglio, 1996). 
The Policy Delphi produces non-numeric, verbal data.  It is used to establish all 
the differing opinions of experts and the pros and cons of each position.  Later, the 
decision makers can utilize the ranking of ideas by the panel members to formulate 
policies or take action (Turoff, 1970).  This fits the purpose of this study in that many 
strategies are offered to combat terrorism.  Decision makers will be able to use the 
results of the study while being made aware of the expressed barriers to 
implementation of individual strategies.  There are four possible objectives for any 
Delphi study. 
1. To explore or expose underlying assumptions or information leading to 
differing judgments. 
2. To seek out information that may generate a consensus of judgment on the 
part of the respondent group. 
3. To correlate informed judgments on a topic spanning a wide range of 
disciplines. 
4. To educate the respondent group as to the diverse and interrelated aspects of 
the topic. 
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A combination of any one of these objectives can be sought as a means for 
soliciting interpretations, predictions, or recommendations (Turoff, 1970). 
Delphi may be characterized as a method for structuring a group 
communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of 
individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem (Linstone & Turoff, 
1979, p.3). 
An advantage of the Delphi method is that it allows a group of experts separated 
by geographical distance to participate in group communication and systematically 
address a complex problem or task.  This is important when there is insufficient 
information upon which to base a decision because the best possible insights of 
experts can be obtained (Adler & Ziglio, 1996).  Furthermore, the Delphi method 
allows avoiding certain disadvantages of face to face group interaction such as the 
bandwagon tendency, deference to the most prestigious or powerful member of the 
group, the vulnerability to manipulation, and the reluctance on the part of individuals 
to change their minds in front of others (Isaac & Michaels, 1990). 
The Delphi method first involves the identification of the group or experts whose 
opinions are sought.  Then a questionnaire is circulated to obtain each group 
member’s list of ideas regarding the topic of the study.  Next, the first round results 
are shared with the individual members of the group who then expand on the 
presented ideas or can change their position.  Finally, the results are listed in random 
order and the panel members are asked to rate or rank the items along with any 
dissent a member may have for a particular idea (Isaac & Michaels, 1990). 
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Among the various scenarios in which a Delphi study is appropriate, the most 
significant for this research in when the problem being studied would benefit most 
from the consideration of many viewpoints and the Delphi method can facilitate 
discussion (Adler & Ziglio, 1996).  Among the many applicable arenas for the 
Delphi, Linstone and Turoff (1979) specifically point out the structuring of a model, 
the pros and cons of potential policy options, and planning.  Therefore, considering 
the literature review of the Delphi method, it should be considered a legitimate 
research technique to facilitate discussion among subject matter experts who 
otherwise would not be able to communicate due to geographical barriers and when 
there is little historical information on the subject being researched. 
Summary of Review of Literature 
It is more important to understand the phenomenon of terrorism than to define it.  
Groups of terrorists will use any means to accomplish their goals, including mass murder 
as a weapon (Dershowitz, 2002, p. 6).  Risk managers must understand the differences in 
dealing with terrorism compared to criminal activity (Tarlow, 2002).  The connection 
between tourism and terrorism is irrefutable.  The tourism industry must recognize that it 
is a target for terror attack.  Terrorists have demonstrated their ability and willingness to 
attack within the United States.   
This review has demonstrated a gap in the literature regarding the specific types of 
security strategies needed to be implemented in the tourism industry along with 
associated barriers to implementation.  It has also shown the need for academic research 
in the tourism security arena and furthermore, the need for a set of specific guidelines on 
security strategies. 
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Finally, it has been pointed out that the Delphi method is an effective and appropriate 
manner in which to collect data and conduct research. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study was to gather strategies and factors from tourism 
security professionals in order to formulate comments from which terrorism risk 
management policies can be developed.  There was an attempt to correlate views and 
opinions regarding terrorism risk management and to allow respondents to react to and 
examine opposing viewpoints.  The intent of this study was to put forth all possible 
options for consideration by individual, corporate, and agency policy makers.  Also, 
criticality and barriers to implementation of any particular strategy as well as examination 
of the acceptability of any particular strategy was included.  The purpose of this study is 
not to make decisions for policy makers, but rather, to provide all available options 
presented by an informed group for consideration by policy makers. 
Research Model 
The literature review pointed out the need for academic, government, and private 
sector cooperation and the need to exchange ideas to address the threat of terrorism in the 
tourism industry.  The issue is not only a local problem, but must be dealt with on a 
national level.  In a comparison study of four different questionnaire methods, Presser 
and Blair (1994) established that an expert panel was more efficient in cost and 
productivity than the other methods.  This study utilized the Delphi technique in order to 
provide structure for the group process.  The Delphi technique administered via email 
thwarts the barrier of financial and time constraints associated with travel and allow 
geographically dispersed subject matter experts to participate from their respective 
locations (Turoff & Hiltz, 1996). 
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The Delphi technique allows for interaction with group members whose opinions 
are sought on an individual and anonymous basis.  The collected feedback of each 
questionnaire is provided individually to each panel member so they can reconsider their 
position and critique others’ without the disadvantage of face-to-face group interaction 
(Linstone & Turoff, 1979). 
When working toward policy decisions, the objectives of a Delphi are a 
combination of discovering all possible options for consideration, estimateing impact and 
consequences of each option, and determining acceptability of any option.  The overall 
goal is not one of creating consensus as much as it is to expose all ideas and strategies 
and the pro and con arguments for each (Linstone & Turoff, 1979).  Weaver (1971) states 
the Delphi best serves when establishing priorities in development of planning tools.  Pill 
(1971) also concluded the Delphi was useful in long range planning where results were 
not immediately available. 
This Delphi study collected data in the form of verbal statements and comments.  
As such, a rating system had to be developed that could evaluate the positions of group 
members pertaining to importance and feasibility of the various ideas.  A scale was 
utilized to provide some reasonable assurance that respondents would make compatible 
distinctions between the concepts available to choose from on the Likert scale (Linstone 
& Turoff, 1979). 
Population 
The sample consisted of subject matter experts who matched the definition of 
“tourism security professional” for the purpose of this study.  The operational definition 
of tourism security professional is an individual who has both academic and applied 
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knowledge in the tourism security field.  To be a professional, one has to have worked in 
the field and had his/her work reviewed by peers.   
The Delphi method requires the assembly of an expert panel to whom a series of 
questionnaires shall be given.  A core group of subject matter experts was gathered 
through a literature search, professional organization listings, and professional conference 
rosters as modified from the Peter Williams study.  Those in the core group were 
contacted and asked to nominate peers they believed to fit the criteria discussed above 
(Williams, 2000).   
A core group of twelve subject matter experts (SME’s) was developed and contacted 
via email.  They were sent an information sheet (see Appendix A) that described the 
study and expectations of participants and were asked to nominate individuals whom they 
believed to be credible experts in the field of tourism security.  This resulted in a list of 
seventy-six names including the original twelve from the core group.  All seventy-six 
were contacted via email and asked to participate in the study.  Thirty-three responded 
and agreed to participate.  Twenty-four participated in round one.  Twelve successfully 
completed round two.  The original thirty-three that agreed to participate in the study 
were invited to participate in round three.  Twelve participants successfully completed 
the round three questionnaires. 
All communication with the panel was conducted via electronic mail.  Participants 
were contacted at the beginning of each round via email and periodically during each 
round to encourage the timely completion of the questionnaires. 
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Procedure 
This study was a Delphi that utilized electronic mail as the means to distribute 
questionnaires, collect data, and communicate with the panel members.  An important 
aspect of the Delphi via the computer format is the consistent participant contact.  The 
feedback process enables participants to respond throughout its entirety and provides 
closure upon completion.  This further enhances the quality of the study since the 
participants are not locked into responding only during the individual rounds (Turoff & 
Hiltz, 1996).  The first step is to choose participants and ask them for additional 
nominees to participate.  A total of ten to fifteen participants is sufficient for a single 
group to be represented.  The group should be contacted and told the purpose of the 
study, the type of study, the composition of the panel and how the results will be shared.  
When the first questionnaire is sent, it should be preceded with a cover letter.  A second 
letter can be sent to encourage the participants to make a timely response (Gilmore & 
Campbell, 2004). 
In this present study, the panel was assembled by using the process described in the 
section on population.  There were three rounds of questionnaires.  The first round was 
exploratory, in that the questionnaire provided an open-ended question that sought from 
the expert panel what ideas or strategies could be implemented in the tourism industry to 
reduce the chance of a terror attack.  For the complete invitation and cover letter see 
Appendix A.  The complete round one questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.  The 
responses from all respondents were compiled into a comprehensive list of strategies and 
techniques the experts proposed to reduce the propensity for terror attacks in the tourism 
industry.  Gilmore & Campbell (2004) posit that after the first round, the researcher 
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should synthesize and analyze the responses.  A master list should be compiled for ease 
of analysis.  This list should be distributed to the panel for clarification and the final list 
should be summarized in clear and concise statements.   
The complete list of strategies that was developed in the first round of this study was 
shared in a second round instrument to the panel.  Refer to Appendix C for the second 
round instrument.  In the second round of the Delphi, each member of the panel is asked 
to rate or rank the items in the master list (Isaac & Michael, 1997).  In the present study, 
the panel was asked to further clarify each idea discussing its strengths and weaknesses 
and to rate the feasibility of each item on a Likert scale.  And following each strategy or 
idea, the panel was asked to state any barriers to implementing the particular strategy 
within the tourism industry.  Any new ideas that resulted during the second round were 
given the same treatment as previously stated ideas.  The average feasibility rating of 
implementation for each strategy was calculated.  The comments from the panel were 
assembled regarding strengths, weaknesses, and barriers to implementation for each idea 
and assimilated into the master list of strategies. 
The information requested in the second round was added to the master list in 
preparation for the third round.  Isaac & Michael (1997) state that in the third round, the 
respondents will begin to see any trends that are developing within the group.  They 
should be asked to rate or rank the items on the list for a second time.  This latest ranking 
along with any comments should be presented to the group as the final statement.  In the 
present study, the third round utilized the results of the second round and asked the panel 
to rank the list of strategies from most critical to the least critical in regards to the effect 
that the strategy will have in decreasing the chance of a terrorist attack.  See the complete 
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questionnaire in Appendix D.  The average ranking of all strategies was calculated.  The 
rankings were correlated with the feasibility ratings and placed accordingly in a 
criticality-feasibility matrix.  Each quadrant of the matrix was assigned a priority level for 
ease of discussion. 
Instrument 
A Delphi technique survey instrument with open-ended questions was used to 
produce verbal data in the first round.  There was additional space after each idea that 
was listed for the respondent to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the particular 
idea.  The purpose of the first round was to collect as many ideas as possible from the 
respondents regarding the reduction for propensity of terror attack.  See Appendix B for 
the round one instrument. 
The second round survey utilized an instrument designed to solicit a rating of the 
compilation of responses from the first round.  Using a Likert scale for the participants to 
respond, the questionnaire derived information about the opinions of professionals as to 
the feasibility of each idea proposed by the panel.  A neutral response was not available 
on the scale as this would provide no useful information (Linstone & Turoff, 1979).  
During this round, the study sought more descriptive data as panel members were asked 
to list the barriers to implementation of each strategy.  This was an opportunity for panel 
members to critique the ideas of other panel members with anonymity.  See Appendix C 
for the complete second round instrument. 
The third round instrument listed the results of the second round in random order and 
asked the panel to rank the list of strategies from most critical to the least.  See Appendix 
D for the round three instrument. 
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Design and Statistics 
This was a basic descriptive and exploratory study using the Delphi technique to 
gather strategies and factors from tourism security professionals in order to formulate 
comments from which terrorism risk management policies can be developed.  The Delphi 
process consisted of three rounds of data collection utilizing a panel of subject matter 
experts.  After the first round, each subsequent round disseminated the data from the 
proceeding round to each member of the panel, followed by the questionnaire for the 
current round.  All questionnaires and communications were conducted via electronic 
mail.   
Seventy-six tourism security experts were invited to participate in the study and were 
sent invitation via email on April 19, 2004 (see Appendix A).  They were sent via email 
the official university information sheet and consent form along with instructions to 
complete the first round questionnaire.  Thirty-three responded and agreed to participate.  
Reminders were sent on May 23rd, July 9th, and September 14th.  The first round was 
ended on October 1, 2004.  Twenty-four group members participated in round one.   
The second round began on November 2, 2004 with an invitation being sent to the 
original thirty-three experts who agreed to participate.  The first round instrument 
generated fifty-four separate ideas or strategies that were included in the round two 
instrument.  The round two questionnaire asked the participants to provide strengths and 
weaknesses to each strategy and to rate each strategy as to its feasibility using the 
provided scale.  Each participant was asked to provide the number of years experience in 
the field.  A reminder email was sent on December 2, 2004.  On January 10, 2005 the 
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second round was ended with a total of twelve group members successfully completing 
the round two instrument.   
The original thirty-three that agreed to participate in the study were invited to 
participate in round three that began on January 17, 2005.  In the third round instrument 
all the ideas from the previous rounds were provided to the participants who were asked 
to rank the ideas from the most critical to the least critical.  A reminder was sent on 
February 1, 2005 and the round was completed on February 10, 2005.  Twelve 
participants successfully completed the round three questionnaires. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
This descriptive study was designed to develop a prototype guideline for the tourism 
industry from which security personnel and risk managers can formulate policies and 
procedures in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack.  A total of fifty-four 
strategies were the result of three rounds of questionnaires distributed to subject matter 
experts.  The following chapter will place those strategies in formats from which the 
reader can gain understanding of the findings. 
In addition to the strategies developed by the study, recommendations regarding 
criticality and feasibility are discussed as well as any barriers to implementation of 
various strategies.  And the following research questions will be addressed: 
1. What are the needs of the Tourism Industry to reduce the risk of terrorist attack? 
2. What are the solutions to the stated needs? 
3. What are the barriers to the stated solutions?  
4. What are the prototype guidelines to apply the solutions to the stated needs? 
Finally, a discussion of ancillary findings will be brought forth. 
Identified Strategies to Reduce Terror Attacks 
 
This section is intended to address the first research question: What are the needs of 
the Tourism Industry to reduce the risk of terrorist attack?  In order to answer the 
question, the first round questionnaire asked the panel of experts “What actions can be 
taken at events and locations (hotels, resorts, theme parks, convention centers, public 
gatherings, etc.) frequented by tourists that could reduce the propensity for terror 
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attacks?”  The result was a comprehensive list of fifty-four strategies to be implemented 
by various operating businesses within the tourism sector as seen in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Detail List of Fifty-Four Strategies to Reduce Terror Attacks 
Strategy #1 Terrorism only works due to media.  National government 
needs to have agreements with media regarding a terrorist 
attack; much the same way they control war footage. 
Strategy #2 Additional training provided to teach first responders about 
terrorist goals and their role in limiting the success of a 
terrorist attack (i.e. what to do after the scene is stabilized). 
Strategy #3 Make non-vital targets more readily available in order to 
channel terrorist activity to those locations.  Ensure non-vital 
targets are politically acceptable. 
Strategy #4 Publicize as many events as possible as being multi-national.  
Tourism must be advertised for success.  Use of in-place 
marketing systems to stress diversity will create additional 
considerations for terrorist in planning an attack. 
Strategy #5 Train event and safety specialists in dynamic as opposed to 
static security techniques.  Utilize diverse and randomized 
methods for screening tourists upon entry to an event and for 
controlling crowd flow during an event.  Where warranted 
bag, purse, and package checks of guests, participants, 
invitees, and employees. 
Strategy #6 Design increasing layers of security around an event based 
upon a risk assessment.  In line with dynamic techniques, 
make heavy use of a double entrance approach; it will be 
difficult for terrorists to breach if they are unsure what 
measures will be in place after the initial entrance.  Any 
persons attempting to leave after the first entrance and before 
the second entrance would be considered suspect. 
Strategy #7 Improve physical design of facilities to take into account the 
terrorist threat.  Design new facilities with crime prevention 
in mind.  Remodel existing facilities with crime prevention 
in mind. 
Strategy #8 Have a unified method to determine risks. 
Strategy #9 Reach out to the community for intelligence.  Establish 
communication between hotels, parks, and other events with 
local and federal law enforcement. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Strategy #10 Having community leaders, including religious leaders, 
speak out in a unified voice against terrorism since most 
recent acts of terrorism are based on some slanted view of 
religion. 
Strategy #11 Ask the media's cooperation in correctly portraying these 
people.  They are not suicide bombers, but homicide 
bombers, they are not freedom fighters, but murderers, and 
they are not to be admired, but scorned. 
Strategy #12 Network with other communities to determine what 
programs have bee successful in combating terrorism. 
Strategy #13 Implement a crisis management plan.  Conduct threat 
assessments for special events and structures to include 
integrated response plans involving private and public first 
responders. 
Strategy #14 Improve intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing 
capabilities among private and public security professionals. 
Strategy #15 Where applicable, personal screening of guests, participates, 
invitees, and employees should be conducted. 
Strategy #16 Conduct thorough background and credit checks on each 
employee. 
Strategy #17 Outside contractors for the event or location should have 
backgrounds conducted on own employees by third party. 
Strategy #18 All employees should have identifying badges and/or tags. 
Strategy #19 All working contractors should be provided with a 
contractor’s Id tag or badge. 
Strategy #20 All employees should come through security check point and 
verified that they are an active employee. 
Strategy #21 All contractors should have a specific parking area and be 
subject to vehicle screening by security personnel. 
Strategy #22 Frequent and high profile public service announcements 
regarding suspicious activities in or near venue, i.e. patrons 
should maintain control of their belongings. 
Strategy #23 Implement the utilization of closed circuit television in 
tourist areas at venue and core surrounding area. 
Strategy #24 Deploy plainclothes law enforcement personnel to detect and 
obtain critical information from within the crowds.  
Personnel can be used for intelligence gathering and counter 
surveillance engagement. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Strategy #25 Utilize special security units that provide confidence to 
visitors (Examples: Bike patrols, Mounted Units, Motorcycle 
Units). 
Strategy #26 Increase cooperative effort/ commitment with federal, state 
and municipal entities. 
Strategy #27 Train personnel (both police and private sector) in 
recognizing potential threats and actions that warrant police 
intervention A training program that empowers every 
employee to be a security agent. 
Strategy #28 Train, equip, and staff police personnel with CBRNE gear. 
Strategy #29 Target-harden venues to include metal detectors. 
Strategy #30 Stage specially trained law enforcement personnel for bomb 
intervention near the venue.  Train staff and deploy 
personnel in bomb detection/suppression.  Deploy 
mechanical bomb detection devices with police and private 
sector security staff. 
Strategy #31 Fund, budget, and deploy air unit support to monitor event. 
Strategy #32 Billboards with instructions on what to do if a crisis occurs. 
People should always know where they are and where they 
are going or where they need to go. 
Strategy #33 Implement the utilization of face recognition software in 
tourist areas. 
Strategy #34 High visibility of law enforcement personnel for a deterrent 
aspect. 
Strategy #35 Enhance security procedures to include the use of manual 
and electronic search methods. 
Strategy #36 Utilize citizen patrols that have been specifically trained to 
enhance security or law enforcement. 
Strategy #37 Plan with the local police department. 
Strategy #38 Ask your guests to be aware. Don't scare them.  Tell them 
their stay will be more enjoyable if they are aware of their 
surroundings and take simple precautions to keep them and 
their belongings safe. 
Strategy #39 Partner with the media to publish safety tips and location 
maps. 
Strategy #40 Use of trained dogs to detect weapons/ contraband.  Deploy 
K9 units to assist in bomb detection. 
Strategy #41 Use training drills to prevent skill decay.  Train and retrain. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Strategy #42 Recognize you (tourism venue) are a target. 
Strategy #43 Tighten-up security at loading dock operations at large 
venues.  Only allow access to those on check lists.  
Implement standard operating procedures for delivery. Any 
and all delivery vehicles should be recorded and driver’s 
license should be recorded. 
Strategy #44 Have regularly scheduled meetings with area venues to keep 
them informed of changing trends in security and to allow 
them a voice to express their concerns. 
Strategy #45 Local law enforcement should become involved in 
organizations and serve on boards when appropriate or when 
asked to do so; i.e. hotel and lodging associations, 
convention and visitors bureaus, chamber of commerce, etc. 
Strategy #46 Use barricades to prevent vehicular intrusion.  Employ 
concrete barriers and spike strips.  Keep vehicles at a 
distance from the perimeter. 
Strategy #47 Cross communicate with local and fed law enforcement on 
updated terrorist intelligence. 
Strategy #48 Utilize off-hour perimeter security patrols at gates and 
fences.  All outer perimeters should be patrolled on a regular 
unscheduled time span. 
Strategy #49 Provide ongoing training for security personnel on terrorists’ 
activity and tactics. 
Strategy #50 Employ cameras with a big screen picture of people walking 
in and around specific strategic areas of interest.  Similar to 
radar trailers; “Do you see how fast you are driving?” 
Strategy #51 Use photo identification and personalized security devices 
(i.e. ID cards, bracelets, etc.) for patrons. 
Strategy #52 Install motion detectors that are voice activated and state 
something to the effect that the premise is under law 
enforcement surveillance. 
Strategy #53 Require advanced reservations to access vital places. Scan 
cards are mailed to allow access to the event. 
Strategy #54 Use radioactive material detection devices throughout 
facilities or event areas. 
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Solutions and Implementation 
The second research question asks, “What are the solutions to the stated needs?”  The 
third research question asks, “What are the barriers to the stated solutions?”  To address 
these questions, a foundation is established with the fifty-four proposed strategies.  The 
strategies clearly establish what experts describe as needing to be done to reduce the 
chance of a terror attack, however implementing those strategies as a solution is too 
simple.  Each strategy brings ramifications and repercussions of its own.  In order to 
formulate solutions, more information must be obtained.  To bring forth this information, 
a second round questionnaire was distributed to the expert panel.  This second 
questionnaire was constructed by providing the comprehensive list of fifty-four strategies 
to the expert panel.  The complete second round instrument can be found in Appendix C.  
The panel was asked to review the list and provide their insight into each individual 
strategy.  Specifically, the panel was asked to provide comments for each strategy 
regarding its strengths and weaknesses and any barriers to implementation.  Also, the 
panel was asked to rate each strategy as to how feasible it would be to implement. Table 
3 represents the Likert scale used for the feasibility rating.  For the complete 
questionnaire see Appendix C.   
Table 3. 
Representation of Round Two Questionnaire Likert Scale 
    
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented 
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
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The feasibility rating for each strategy from the individual panel members was 
collected and placed in Table 4 below. 
Table 4 
Feasibility Rating of Fifty-four Proposed Strategies by SME 
(Listed by strategy number, Most Feasible = 1, Least Feasible = 4) 
 
SME Code Number 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12   
1  4 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 3  3.83 
2  2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2  1.83 
3  3 4 3 3 4 3 2 4 4 3 3 3  3.08 
4  4 3 3 3 4 2 1 1 3 2 3 3  2.67 
5  2 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 2  2.08 
6  2 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 4 3 2 3  2.50 
7  2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2  2.17 
8  1 3 3 2 2 3 4 2 4 2 3 1  2.25 
9  4 3 2 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 2  2.25 
10  1 3 4 3 4 4 3 2 3 2 3 3  2.83 
11  3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 3  3.50 
12  2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1  1.33 
13  1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1  1.25 
14  4 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2  2.08 
15  3 2 2 2 2 1 2 4 3 2 1 2  2.17 
16  2 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 2  1.92 
17  3 2 2 1 4 3 2 1 1 2 2 2  2.17 
18  2 2 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1  1.50 
19  2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1  1.33 
20  2 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2  1.92 
21  3 2 3 3 4 2 1 3 2 2 2 2  2.42 
22  2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2  1.92 
23  3 3 2 3 2 4 2 1 2 4 3 2  2.58 
24  2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2  1.58 
25  3 3 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 2  2.17 
26  2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2  1.92 
27  2 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2  1.83 
28  3 3 2 3 2 3 2 4 2 1 4 2  2.58 
29  2 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2  2.00 
30  2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3  2.33 
31  3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2  2.25 
32  2 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 2  2.33 
33  2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 1 2 2  2.00 
34  2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1  1.50 
Strategy 
Average 
Rating 
Strategies 
listed one 
through 
fifty-four 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
SME Code Number 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12   
35  2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 2 2 4  2.67 
36  3 4 2 3 3 4 1 2 4 3 3 4  3.00 
37  2 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 2  2.08 
38  3 2 3 2 2 3 1 2 3 4 4 3  2.67 
39  3 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 2  2.08 
40  2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2  1.92 
41  3 3 2 3 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2  2.58 
42  1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1  1.08 
43  1 2 1 3 2 2 3 1 1 2 1 2  1.75 
44  1 2 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 3 2 2  1.83 
45  3 4 3 2 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 2  2.67 
46  2 2 3 4 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 2  2.25 
47  2 2 1 2 2 2 3 1 3 2 4 2  2.17 
48  2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2  1.67 
49  4 3 1 2 3 3 2 3 4 2 4 3  2.83 
50  3 2 3 2 2 3 2 4 4 3 1 2  2.58 
51  2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2  2.08 
52  3 2 3 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 2  3.17 
53  3 4 3 4 4 2 1 4 1 2 3 1  2.67 
54  3 2 2 4 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 2  2.25 
Note: For Strategy Details See Table 2. 
It was noted during analysis that the values assigned to the Likert scale needed to be 
reversed in order to be congruent with the ranking values.  After reassigning the numeric 
values (Most Feasible = 1, Least Feasible = 4), the average feasibility rating for each 
strategy was calculated and reflected in Table 4 above. 
The comments by panel members regarding the strengths and weaknesses of each 
strategy as well as comments pertaining to any barriers to implementation on any given 
strategy were collected and compiled into a usable format.  These comments can be 
observed in Tables 7,8,9, and 10 in the next section to provide readers with what to 
expect when considering implementing the proposed strategies. 
Strategies 
listed one 
through 
fifty-four 
Strategy 
Average 
Rating 
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Prototype Guidelines 
The fourth research question asks, “What are the prototype guidelines to apply the 
solutions to the stated needs?”  An explanation of the analysis and formats for 
considering strategy implementation is discussed in this section.  And it is in this section 
that a set of guidelines shall emerge.  In the final round of the Delphi, the expert panel 
was asked to rank the comprehensive list of strategies from the most critical to the least 
critical.  See the third round instrument in Appendix D.  Once the data were collected, the 
average rank order of criticality of each strategy was calculated.  See Table 5 below for 
the ranking of strategies by the SME’s. 
Table 5 
Rank Order Score of Fifty-four Proposed Strategies by SME 
(Listed by strategy code number,  
Scores: 1 = most critical, 54 = least critical) 
 
SME Code Number  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12   
1  51 39 11 26 13 45 50 5 16 27 48 34  30.42
2  1 17 10 47 8 10 24 19 7 19 7 37  17.17
3  52 40 8 3 12 18 47 42 30 15 53 52  31.00
4  42 38 1 5 17 31 24 13 20 39 50 46  27.17
5  13 11 12 46 5 8 7 12 18 13 14 6  13.75
6  41 42 46 40 41 44 39 40 47 51 49 47  43.92
7  3 10 3 1 7 6 1 3 11 12 6 7  5.83
8  4 2 25 6 3 4 26 25 12 9 10 12  11.50
9  5 5 39 2 6 5 8 14 22 11 13 10  11.67
10  8 35 40 8 10 11 14 8 13 17 24 27  17.92
11  9 37 9 4 11 9 10 11 14 4 8 13  11.58
12  10 13 14 10 9 7 9 15 6 10 11 11  10.42
13  25 3 23 48 40 22 15 18 10 24 20 14  21.83
14  6 6 13 11 4 12 12 10 8 7 15 9  9.42
15  15 14 16 44 27 26 23 24 21 16 26 24  23.00
16  14 16 4 51 14 13 16 22 23 18 18 15  18.67
17  44 44 5 17 15 43 52 21 15 40 47 51  32.83
18  17 18 6 18 16 19 17 16 9 14 16 23  15.75
19  20 19 26 19 18 17 22 20 25 26 25 21  21.50
20  16 49 27 21 25 24 25 26 49 23 29 18  27.67
Strategy 
Code 
Number 
Strategy 
Average 
Score 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
SME Code Number 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12   
21  28 46 36 35 39 37 31 36 40 34 39 28  35.75
22  29 36 17 23 22 25 29 23 37 31 27 26  27.08
23  30 21 20 24 25 21 19 27 26 20 23 16  22.67
24  27 22 18 16 24 23 18 8 24 25 22 25  21.00
25  26 12 19 25 2 20 21 17 27 22 21 22  19.50
26  2 4 31 9 19 14 13 9 5 21 12 20  13.25
27  19 48 21 17 28 35 34 39 41 28 30 32  31.00
28  18 24 24 39 29 27 20 29 28 30 34 36  28.17
29  36 41 7 41 38 40 33 43 36 43 28 19  33.75
30  34 25 15 7 20 28 35 33 31 38 40 29  27.92
31  35 26 22 52 30 32 28 30 32 29 41 50  33.92
32  22 33 33 28 31 33 36 34 29 32 38 39  32.33
33  37 27 29 29 32 30 38 31 19 37 42 40  32.58
34  38 47 28 53 42 46 40 41 39 44 46 49  42.75
35  23 49 38 30 33 41 37 32 35 33 32 38  35.08
36  45 54 44 31 34 47 51 48 42 41 45 41  43.58
37  39 51 45 45 46 48 49 44 52 42 44 42  45.58
38  40 50 41 50 44 49 48 45 46 45 43 44  45.42
39  24 34 42 32 34 49 42 35 38 36 31 30  35.58
40  21 23 43 33 35 16 30 7 17 35 19 17  24.67
41  31 15 47 34 45 36 32 37 33 8 17 31  30.50
42  33 1 35 37 21 3 11 6 34 5 9 33  19.00
43  32 28 34 43 36 34 41 38 43 46 37 35  37.25
44  11 8 30 36 1 2 6 4 4 6 1 5  18.50
45  12 9 21 42 23 15 5 2 3 3 33 8  14.00
46  43 45 49 49 47 50 46 46 44 52 51 48  47.50
47  46 7 2 20 37 1 2 1 2 10 5 4  11.42
48  47 20 37 22 48 29 4 48 1 47 4 2  25.75
49  54 53 54 54 54 53 45 53 51 49 52 53  52.08
50  53 30 53 12 52 42 43 52 54 53 54 54  46.00
51  48 32 51 13 51 54 53 49 50 51 36 45  44.42
52  7 34 50 14 53 52 54 51 53 54 35 43  41.67
53  49 29 52 38 49 51 44 54 45 2 3 3  34.92
54  50 52 48 15 50 38 3 50 48 48 2 1  33.75
Note: For Strategy Details See Table 2. 
In order to correlate the criticality level of each strategy with its corresponding 
feasibility of implementation, a criticality-feasibility matrix was devised.  Using the 
average feasibility ratings and average criticality rankings, strategies were placed in the 
Strategy 
Code 
Number 
Strategy 
Average 
Score 
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appropriate quadrant of the matrix.  Each quadrant of the matrix was assigned a level 
designated by Alpha, Beta, Chi, and Delta.  For matters of discussion, every strategy can 
now be referred to as having a specific level of priority.  Alpha level strategies are known 
to be of the highest criticality and the highest degree of feasibility for implementation.  
Likewise, Beta level strategies are highly critical, but have a low degree of feasibility for 
implementation.  Then Chi level strategies are designated as having low criticality even 
though they are easily implemented.  And finally, Delta level strategies are of a low 
critical nature with difficulty in implementation.  This matrix provides for a user-friendly 
format for the reader to observe strategy clusters according to their criticality ranking and 
feasibility rating.  This matrix is shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6 
Criticality-Feasibility Matrix 
 
Strategy numbers placed in priority levels based 
on average critical rank and average feasibility 
rating. 
 
 
 
 
2, 12,13, 16, 18, 19, 
20, 22, 24, 26, 40, 
42, 44, 48 
 
 
 
ALPHA 
4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
14, 15, 23, 25, 45, 
47 
 
 
 
BETA 
27, 34, 43 
 
 
 
 
 
CHI 
1, 3, 6, 17, 21, 28, 
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 
35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 
41, 46, 49, 50, 51, 
52, 53, 54 
 
DELTA 
High 
Criticality 
Low 
Criticality 
High 
Feasibility 
Low 
Feasibility 
 
 
Note: 
 
o Only strategies scoring an average rating of “easily 
accomplished” are placed in the high feasibility category. 
  
 o Strategies ranked in the top fifty-percent of the criticality 
ranking are placed in the high criticality category. 
  
Note: See Appendix C for the complete Round Two Instrument with 
Feasibility Ratings.  See Table 2 for details on each strategy. 
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Now that a system is in place to prioritize the strategies, the stated barriers to 
implementation by the expert panel along with any stated strengths and weaknesses 
must be attached to each strategy.  Tables 7,8,9, and 10 provide a listing of the fifty-
four strategies with priority level, barriers to implementation, and strengths and 
weaknesses of each strategy. 
Table 7 shows the fourteen strategies that fell into the Alpha level of priority.  
According to the expert panel, these are the most critical strategies that are easily 
accomplished.  These are the strategies that should first be considered by the tourism 
industry.  Being redundant in stressing the point, these strategies will be the easiest to 
implement while being of the most critical nature toward reducing the propensity of 
terror attack. 
Strategy 2 ranked the highest priority over all others.  It addresses the subject of 
training first responders on how to minimize the effects of a terrorist attack.  
Otherwise, the Alpha level is heavily weighted with seven different strategies 
pertaining to sharing of information and on-premises security activities.  A total of 
twelve strategies are listed at the Alpha level. 
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Table 7 
Alpha Level Strategies with Barriers by Priority Level 
(Alpha = High Criticality, High Feasibility) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Alpha  2 Additional training provided 
to teach first responders about 
terrorist goals and their role in 
limiting the success of a 
terrorist attack (i.e. what to do 
after the scene is stabilized). 
 Consistency of 
quality of training. 
 A decentralized law 
enforcement 
apparatus. 
 Provides a sense of 
responsibility and 
involvement in the 
war on terror. 
 First step toward 
educating the entire 
population on 
awareness. 
 
 Takes time to 
accomplish. 
 Skill deterioration 
due to infrequent 
training. 
Alpha 12 Network with other 
communities to determine 
what programs have bee 
successful in combating 
terrorism. 
 Incompatible 
technological 
systems 
 Information 
sharing is critical in 
preventing an 
attack. 
 Reluctance to share 
ideas that could be 
profitable. 
 Determining 
success of 
programs if attacks 
are rare in the area. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Alpha 13 Implement a crisis 
management plan.  Conduct 
threat assessments for special 
events and structures to 
include integrated response 
plans involving private and 
public first responders. 
 
 Cost to meet 
demands of planning 
(equipment, 
personnel, etc.) 
 Good deterrent.  Different methods 
to conduct 
assessments. 
 Cannot plan for 
everything. 
Alpha 16 Conduct thorough background 
and credit checks on each 
employee. 
 ACLU 
 Position Dependant. 
 Added expense. 
 Reduces 
opportunity for 
terrorist infiltration 
into workforce. 
 Time consuming. 
 Could be 
circumvented. 
Alpha 18 All employees should have 
identifying badges and/or tags.
 Expense of system.  System provides 
positive 
identification of 
personnel. 
 Additional layer of 
security that must 
be penetrated. 
 Counterfeit badges 
can be obtained. 
 ID badges can be 
lost or stolen. 
 Complacency of 
security personnel 
in checking ID’s. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Alpha  19 All working contractors
should be provided with a 
contractor’s Id tag or badge. 
 Expense of system. 
 (Same as strategy 
18). 
 System provides 
positive 
identification of 
personnel. 
 Additional layer of 
security that must 
be penetrated. 
 Counterfeit badges 
can be obtained. 
 ID badges can be 
lost or stolen. 
 Complacency of 
security personnel 
in checking ID’s. 
Alpha 20 All employees should come 
through security check point 
and verified that they are an 
active employee. 
 Additional personnel 
and equipment. 
 Issuing of policy and 
procedures. 
 Good preventative 
measures. 
 Employees may 
circumvent the 
system due to 
inconvenience. 
 Complacency at 
checkpoint. 
 
Alpha 22 Frequent and high profile 
public service announcements 
regarding suspicious activities 
in or near venue, i.e. patrons 
should maintain control of 
their belongings. 
  Keeps public 
aware. 
 Guests may 
become 
complacent after 
hearing repetitive 
announcements. 
 Terrorists hear the 
announcements as 
well. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Alpha 24 Deploy plainclothes law 
enforcement personnel to 
detect and obtain critical 
information from within the 
crowds.  Personnel can be 
used for intelligence gathering 
and counter surveillance 
engagement. 
 Cost associated with 
additional personnel. 
 Can obtain 
information not 
found by other 
means. 
 Can detect 
preplanning 
surveillance by 
terrorists. 
 
Alpha 26 Increase cooperative effort/ 
commitment with federal, 
state and municipal entities. 
 Territorial issues.  Increases 
effectiveness. 
 Rotating 
administrations 
cannot mandate 
cooperation. 
Alpha 40 Use of trained dogs to detect 
weapons/ contraband.  Deploy 
K9 units to assist in bomb 
detection. 
 Expensive. 
 Fear of possible 
litigation. 
 
 One of the most 
effective available 
deterrents. 
 
Alpha 42 Recognize you (tourism 
venue) are a target. 
  Increase 
organizational 
awareness. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy    
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Alpha 44 Have regularly scheduled 
meetings with area venues to 
keep them informed of 
changing trends in security 
and to allow them a voice to 
express their concerns. 
 
 Trust issues between 
entities. 
  
Alpha 48 Utilize off-hour perimeter 
security patrols at gates and 
fences.  All outer perimeters 
should be patrolled on a 
regular unscheduled time 
span. 
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The Beta level in Table 8 shows a total of thirteen strategies falling into the second 
highest priority level.  Six of these thirteen strategies are focused on sharing of 
information and networking, a strong point brought forth in the work of Calhoun and 
Weston’s proposal on contemporary threat management.  Considering a similar 
emphasis in the Alpha level, it shows the importance that the expert panel places on 
communication within and outside the tourism sector.  This is supported by the WTTC 
action plan and DHS recommendations discussed in previous sections. 
To distinguish between the Alpha and Beta levels, it is important to note that all 
the strategies are in the top fifty percent regarding criticality.  The difference is in the 
feasibility when considering implementation.  Only Alpha strategies were rated as 
being easily accomplished.  At the Beta level, twelve of the thirteen strategies were 
reated as feasible.  Only one, strategy 11, received a rating less then feasible.  It was 
the high criticality value that kept strategy 11 at the Beta level of priority.  Strategy 11 
deals with the cooperation of the news media. 
It can also be noted here that the study yielded four strategies that in some form 
addressed planning and risk assessment.  Of those four strategies, three fell into the 
top fifty percent regarding criticality.  Strategies 13 and 42 are in the Alpha level of 
priority and Strategy 8 fell into the Beta level.  Sound security plans, re-assessment, 
and planning adjustments are all discussed in the WTTC and DHS recommendations. 
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Table 8  
Beta Level Strategies with Barriers by Priority Level 
(Beta = High Criticality, Lo Feasibility) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Beta 4 Publicize as many events as 
possible as being multi-
national.  Tourism must be 
advertised for success.  Use of 
in-place marketing systems to 
stress diversity will create 
additional considerations for 
terrorist in planning an attack. 
  Cost effective.  Terrorists do not 
care who they harm 
with regards to 
ethnicity or 
religion. 
 Minority groups 
may feel used and 
create distrust. 
 
Beta 5 Train event and safety 
specialists in dynamic as 
opposed to static security 
techniques.  Utilize diverse 
and randomized methods for 
screening tourists upon entry 
to an event and for controlling 
crowd flow during an 
event.  Where warranted bag, 
purse, and package checks of 
guests, participants, invitees, 
and employees. 
 Inconvenience. 
 4th amendment 
issues. 
 Racial profiling 
issues. 
 Limited personnel 
resources. 
 Cost. 
 Good deterrent.  Lack of 
consistency by low 
paid personnel. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Beta 7 Improve physical design of 
facilities to take into account 
the terrorist threat.  Design 
new facilities with crime 
prevention in mind.  Remodel 
existing facilities with crime 
prevention in mind. 
 
 Increased cost of 
design 
 Effective in 
providing 
protection and 
proven deterrent. 
 Education of 
architects in 
CPTED. 
Beta 8 Have a unified method to 
determine risks. 
 Personnel resistance 
to change or methods 
not of their own. 
 Standardization.  If terrorists obtain 
“the standard” it 
can become a 
weakness or 
exploited. 
Beta 9 Reach out to the community 
for intelligence.  Establish 
communication between 
hotels, parks, and other events 
with local and federal law 
enforcement. 
 Requires cooperation 
among many 
different interest 
groups. 
 “Grass roots” idea. 
 Cost effective. 
 Some may resist 
participation for 
fear of reprisal. 
 Some information 
may be overlooked 
due to high 
volume. 
 Reluctance of law 
enforcement to 
involve outside 
entities. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Beta 10 Having community leaders, 
including religious leaders, 
speak out in a unified voice 
against terrorism since most 
recent acts of terrorism are 
based on some slanted view of 
religion. 
 Extremists have 
distorted view of 
their religion. 
 May affect a 
minute portion of 
religious fanatics 
who believe 
terrorists. 
 Cost effective. 
 Terrorists not 
likely to consider 
views of 
conservative 
religious leaders. 
 Islamic religious 
leaders not likely to 
speak out against 
own religious 
radicals. 
 
Beta 11 Ask the media's cooperation 
in correctly portraying these 
people.  They are not suicide 
bombers, but homicide 
bombers, they are not freedom 
fighters, but murderers, and 
they are not to be admired, but 
scorned. 
 Lack of support from 
liberal media. 
  Bias media will 
report what/ how 
benefits ratings or 
pushes an agenda. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Beta  14 Improve intelligence
gathering, analysis, and 
sharing capabilities among 
private and public security 
professionals. 
 Cost; time 
consuming; security 
clearances; need to 
know basis of 
personnel. 
 Information 
sharing is critical in 
preventing an 
attack. 
 Unwanted or 
misdirected 
dissemination.  
Terrorists can 
infiltrate both 
entities.  Security 
breaches are 
possible.  
Information 
overload. 
 
Beta 15 Where applicable, personal 
screening of guests, 
participates, invitees, and 
employees should be 
conducted. 
 Inconvenience to 
public. 
 Crowd control. 
 Racial profiling 
issues. 
 Could cause uproar 
among privacy 
advocates. 
 
 Good deterrent.  Terrorists can plan 
around or 
circumvent. 
 Consistency of 
training and 
complacency. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Beta 23 Implement the utilization of 
closed circuit television in 
tourist areas at venue and core 
surrounding area. 
 
 Cost. 
 Additional 
equipment and 
personnel to operate. 
 Good deterrent and 
surveillance 
method. 
 
Beta 25 Utilize special security units 
that provide confidence to 
visitors (Examples: Bike 
patrols, Mounted Units, 
Motorcycle Units). 
 Cost beyond basic 
services. 
 Public relations 
tool. 
 Not cost effective. 
Beta 45 Local law enforcement should 
become involved in 
organizations and serve on 
boards when appropriate or 
when asked to do so; i.e. hotel 
and lodging associations, 
convention and visitors 
bureaus, chamber of 
commerce, etc. 
 Time consuming for 
job function. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy    
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Beta 47 Cross communicate with local 
and fed law enforcement on 
updated terrorist intelligence. 
 Reoccurring changes 
in administrations 
can alter cooperation 
levels. 
 Front line defense 
mechanisms 
become more 
effective. 
 Information 
overload can result. 
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Moving into the Chi level of priority, there were only three strategies as can be 
seen in Table 9.  The Chi level contains strategies that are in the lower fifty percentile 
of criticality, however they are easily accomplished.  The three strategies in the Chi 
level pertained to the training of employees on security issues and securing personnel 
access to a facility.  Looking at the barriers and weaknesses to the strategies, there is a 
concern about the lower wage earning employees.  These type workers are generally 
viewed as not taking the training seriously and not staying on the job for an extended 
period of time.  A high turn over rate of employment would cause a high level of 
repetitive training with new employees on a continual basis. 
Delta level priority indicates strategies that are low in criticality and not feasible to 
implement.  These are strategies to which a venue operator would give the least 
amount of consideration.  Twenty-four proposed strategies fell into this level of 
priority as shown in Table 10.  The strategy topics covered the gamut, however, a 
cluster of six strategies were related to the use of technology.  In fact, all the strategies 
developed in this study involving the use of technology fell into the Delta level.  The 
common barrier to implementation that ultimately led to being placed at the Delta 
level is cost.  This should be monitored closely as technology continues to advance 
and costs decrease.  Federal funding might be considered to offset costs. 
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Table 9 
Chi Level Strategies with Barriers by Priority Level 
(Chi = Lo Criticality, High Feasibility) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Chi 27 Train personnel (both police 
and private sector) in 
recognizing potential threats 
and actions that warrant police 
intervention A training 
program that empowers every 
employee to be a security 
agent. 
 Employees must take 
training serious. 
 Repetitive training 
where high turnover 
exists. 
 Vital to educate 
employees. 
 Reluctance of low 
wage earners to 
take training 
seriously. 
 Lack of transfer 
and continuous 
training. 
Chi 34 High visibility of law 
enforcement personnel for a 
deterrent aspect. 
 Costs.  Deterrent aspect. 
 Immediate 
availability of 
personnel. 
 Training adequate 
numbers of 
personnel. 
Chi 43 Tighten-up security at loading 
dock operations at large 
venues.  Only allow access to 
those on check lists.  
Implement standard operating 
procedures for delivery. Any 
and all delivery vehicles 
should be recorded and 
driver’s license should be 
recorded. 
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Table 10 
Delta Level Strategies with Barriers by Priority Level 
(Delta = Lo Criticality, Lo Feasibility) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Delta 1 Terrorism only works due to 
media.  National government 
needs to have agreements with 
media regarding a terrorist 
attack; much the same way 
they control war footage. 
 
 Unconstitutional. 
 Gaining cooperation 
of media. 
 Media coverage 
gives terrorists the 
publicity they 
desire, cutting them 
off reduces the 
rewards of the risk. 
 Freedom of speech 
violation. 
Delta 3 Make non-vital targets more 
readily available in order to 
channel terrorist activity to 
those locations.  Ensure non-
vital targets are politically 
acceptable. 
 Lack of political 
support. 
 Public outcries for 
stating certain targets 
are acceptable. 
 Legal/ ethical issues. 
 
 Exercising limited 
control over 
terrorists. 
 These type targets 
not of interest to 
terrorist. 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Delta 6 Design increasing layers of 
security around an event based 
upon a risk assessment.  In 
line with dynamic techniques, 
make heavy use of a double 
entrance approach; it will be 
difficult for terrorists to 
breach if they are unsure what 
measures will be in place after 
the initial entrance.  Any 
persons attempting to leave 
after the first entrance and 
before the second entrance 
would be considered suspect. 
 Cost of additional 
manpower. 
 Common sense 
approach. 
 Reduces chance of 
terrorist’s success. 
 Terrorists will 
probe security 
layers to find 
weaknesses. 
Delta 17 Outside contractors for the 
event or location should have 
backgrounds conducted on 
own employees by third party. 
 Relying on 
contractors to ensure 
employees are 
legitimate. 
 Added expense to 
contractor is passed 
on to customer. 
 
 Diminishes 
opportunity for 
terrorists to access 
vulnerable areas. 
 Temptation of 
contractor falsify 
background check 
to reduce costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
71 
    
Table 10 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Delta 21 All contractors should have a 
specific parking area and be 
subject to vehicle screening by 
security personnel. 
 Availability of space.  Good deterrent.  
Delta 28 Train, equip, and staff police 
personnel with CBRNE gear. 
 Cost.  Protection of 
responders. 
 Availability of gear 
when needed. 
Delta 29 Target-harden venues to 
include metal detectors. 
 Cost.  
 Logistics. 
 
  Complacency of 
personnel. 
 False sense of 
security. 
 
Delta 30 Stage specially trained law 
enforcement personnel for 
bomb intervention near the 
venue.  Train staff and deploy 
personnel in bomb 
detection/suppression.  Deploy 
mechanical bomb detection 
devices with police and 
private sector security staff. 
 Expensive.   Only feasible in 
large metropolitan 
areas. 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Delta 31 Fund, budget, and deploy air 
unit support to monitor event. 
 Very expensive.  Provides 
observation 
platform. 
 Becoming overly 
dependant on a 
system is not 
available 100% 
(bad weather). 
Delta   
   
32 Billboards with instructions
on what to do if a crisis 
occurs. People should always 
know where they are and 
where they are going or where 
they need to go. 
  Keeps security on 
the minds of 
public. 
 
 Cost effective. 
 Makes terrorists 
aware of 
evacuation plans 
and could use to 
deploy secondary 
bombs.  
Delta 35 Enhance security procedures 
to include the use of manual 
and electronic search methods. 
 
Delta 36 Utilize citizen patrols that 
have been specifically trained 
to enhance security or law 
enforcement. 
 
 Maintaining level of 
training. 
 Cost effective.  Can be difficult to 
train. 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Delta 37 Plan with the local police 
department. 
 
 Dependent upon 
specific event. 
  
Delta 38 Ask your guests to be aware. 
Don't scare them.  Tell them 
their stay will be more 
enjoyable if they are aware of 
their surroundings and take 
simple precautions to keep 
them and their belongings 
safe. 
  Increases public 
awareness. 
 Hard to determine 
effectiveness of 
strategy. 
 May increase false 
reports. 
Delta 39 Partner with the media to 
publish safety tips and 
location maps. 
 
 May or may not be 
without costs. 
  No assurance on 
number of people 
who will be 
receptive. 
Delta 41 Use training drills to prevent 
skill decay.  Train and retrain. 
 
 Available time for 
training. 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Delta 46 Use barricades to prevent 
vehicular intrusion.  Employ 
concrete barriers and spike 
strips.  Keep vehicles at a 
distance from the perimeter. 
 
 Cost.  These are proven 
methods. 
 Can create time 
delays at large 
venues. 
Delta 49 Provide ongoing training for 
security personnel on 
terrorists’ activity and tactics. 
 Cost.  
  
 Lack of transfer. 
Delta 50 Employ cameras with a big 
screen picture of people 
walking in and around specific 
strategic areas of interest.  
Similar to radar trailers; “Do 
you see how fast you are 
driving?” 
 
 Costs.  Easily negotiated 
by terrorists. 
Delta 51 Use photo identification and 
personalized security devices 
(i.e. ID cards, bracelets, etc.) 
for patrons. 
 Cost. 
 Providing the ID to 
the patron creates 
time delay issues. 
 
 Good deterrent.  
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Priority 
Level 
Strategy 
 Number Strategy    
Stated Barriers to 
Implementation Strengths Weaknesses
Delta 52 Install motion detectors that 
are voice activated and state 
something to the effect that 
the premise is under law 
enforcement surveillance. 
 Cost.   Small effect/ 
return. 
Delta 53 Require advanced reservations 
to access vital places. Scan 
cards are mailed to allow 
access to the event. 
 
 Cost. 
 Time constraints for 
reservations. 
  
Delta 54 Use radioactive material 
detection devices throughout 
facilities or event areas. 
 Expensive.  Quick screening 
technique. 
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During the analysis of priority levels, the researcher began to recognize similar 
generalized topics among strategies.  Sorting the strategies into subordinate categories 
was based on the researcher’s eighteen years experience in law enforcement and training 
development.  The entire data collection from this study is included and can be used by 
future researchers to come to their own conclusions about similarities or subcategories of 
the strategies. 
Looking at the subordinate category of Training for example, there are five strategies 
involving some form of training needs, Strategy number 2 at the Alpha Level, Strategy 
Number 5 at the Beta Level, Strategy Number 27 at the Chi Level, and Strategies 
Number 41 and 49 at the Delta Level.  Yet the details on the type of training are of a 
different nature.  Strategy Number 2 involves training first responders on their role in 
circumventing the success of terrorists following an attack.  Strategy Number 5 states a 
need to train event personnel in dynamic security techniques.  Strategy Number 27 
explains the need to train personnel in recognizing behaviors that warrant police and 
security intervention prelude to an attack.  Strategy Number 41 promotes scenario 
training on an ongoing basis to prevent personnel skill decay.  And finally, Strategy 
Number 49 involves educating personnel on terrorists’ tactics and methods.  Again, all 
afore mentioned strategies involve training in various forms and each training strategy 
has been prioritized for the user who is looking for training solutions. 
The subordinate category of Communication/ Liaison deals with a myriad of entities 
including the general public.  Twelve strategies within this subordinate category range 
from marketing techniques to the sharing of information between law enforcement, 
private security, and the community.  Planning/ Assessment strategies involve risk and 
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crisis management issues as well as organizations making the connection with being a 
target for attack.   Different Background Check strategies emerged as a subcategory as an 
obvious to means reduce infiltration of terrorists into the workforce or other related work 
forces.  Strategies within the ID Badge/ Security Entrance deal with not only employee 
issues, but also the attendees of various events or locations.  There are various strategies 
involving Specialty Security Units that form a subcategory and range from technical 
expertise to simple public relations.  Architectural Design is a subcategory that appeared 
because of six different strategies that stated the need for various types of functional 
designs for physical protection to include new construction and remodeling of existing 
venues.  Gaining the cooperation of the media was recognized as a subordinate category 
with three different strategies being proposed.  And finally the last subordinate category 
was Technology Based strategies of which there were six. 
The emergent subordinate categories are Training, Communication/ Liaison, 
Planning/ Assessment, Background Checks, Identification Badges/ Secure Entrance, 
Specialized Security Units, Architectural Design, Media Cooperation, and Technology 
Based.  Each one of these subordinate categories came to light because of similarities 
between strategies even though each strategy was a stand-alone solution or need. 
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Placing strategies in subordinate categories will help the venue operator to see what 
areas his or her organization would most benefit.  So now, what emerges in the form of a 
prototype guideline is a reference format where specific strategies can be broken down 
into four levels of priority and within each level the strategies can be placed into nine 
different subordinate categories as shown in Table 11. 
To summarize the use of the Prototype Guidelines, the user will have at first glance 
four priority levels to consider.  Within each level the user can quickly discern among 
nine different areas or types of strategies from which address their individual needs.  Or, 
the user may have an issue regarding Planning and Assessment.  In that case, the user can 
look to the appropriate subordinate category and have a list of strategies provided in a 
prioritized format.  Once a particular area is selected, the user can refer to the detailed list 
of strategies with additional support from comments stating the barriers to 
implementation, the strengths and the weaknesses of each strategy as was shown in 
Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10. 
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Table 11 
Prototype Guidelines 
 
Alpha level strategies in subordinate categories
Training 
 
Communication/ 
Liaison 
Planning/ 
Assessment 
 
Background 
Checks 
 
ID Badges/ 
Secure 
Entrance 
Specialty 
Security 
Units 
Architectural 
Design 
 
Media 
Cooperation 
 
Technology 
Based 
 2 12,22,26,44
 
   
      
         
13,42 16 18,19,20
 
24,40,48
 
Beta level strategies in subordinate categories
Training 
 
Communication/ 
Liaison 
Planning/ 
Assessment 
  
Background 
Checks 
 
ID Badges/ 
Secure 
Entrance 
 
Specialty 
Security 
Units 
Architectural 
Design 
Media 
Cooperation 
 
Technology 
Based 
 5 4,9,10,14,45,47
 
8 15 25  
        
         
7,23 11
Chi  level strategies in subordinate categories
Training 
Communication/ 
Liaison 
 
Planning/ 
Assessment 
 
Background 
Checks 
 
ID Badges/ 
Secure 
Entrance 
Specialty 
Security 
Units 
Architectural 
Design 
 
Media 
Cooperation 
 
Technology 
Based 
27    
         
         
43 34
Delta level strategies in subordinate categories
Training 
Communication/ 
Liaison 
Planning/ 
Assessment 
Background 
Checks 
ID Badges/ 
Secure 
Entrance 
Specialty 
Security 
Units 
Architectural 
Design 
Media 
Cooperation 
Technology 
Based 
41,49        
      
32,38 37 17 21,51,53
 
30,31,36
 
3,6,29,46
 
1,39
28,33,35,50,
52,54 
Note: See appendix A for details on each strategy. 
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Ancillary Findings 
There are several findings not anticipated by the researcher, but worthy of being 
noted in this section.  Continuing to consider the subordinate categories, 
Communications/ Liaison stands out from the other eight in that it contains more 
strategies than any other subordinate category.  And of its twelve strategies, ten fell into 
the high criticality ranking.  Four of the strategies are at the Alpha Level meaning they 
are of high criticality and are easily accomplished when implemented.  This is an 
indication that among the subject matter experts, communications and liaison strategies 
are of the greatest importance in combating the threat of terror attack in the tourism 
industry.  The two remaining strategies fell into the Delta Level.  Strategy 32 proposed 
the use of billboards to instruct patrons what to do and where to go if an attack should 
occur.  The weakness to this strategy is that the terrorist can use this information to plan 
their attack.  For example, secondary bombs can be placed along escape routes or other 
areas where crowds will likely congregate.  Strategy 38 expresses a need to ask guests to 
help with some security aspects.  Weaknesses for this strategy were listed as difficulty to 
determine effectiveness and the likelihood of false reports.  The stated weaknesses of 
these strategies are evidence as to the reason for them receiving a low priority level. 
The subordinate category receiving the second highest number of strategies was 
Specialty Security Units.  It received eight proposed strategies of which only three fell 
into the Alpha Level and one fell into the Beta Level.  No other subordinate categories 
drew more than six strategies. 
The subordinate category of Background Checks contains two strategies.  Strategy 16 
deals with background checks done on employees of the venue and was rated at the 
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Alpha Level.  Strategy 17 deals with background checks done by independent contractors 
on their own employees prior to them being given access to the venue, however this 
strategy received a rating at the Delta Level.  A clue as to the reason for the disparity 
between the two strategies is found in the comments made by the expert panel.  Strategy 
17 is viewed as having barriers and weaknesses by relying on the contractor to perform 
adequate background checks on employees due to added costs for the contractor. 
Strategy 11 is a point of interest in that it is the only strategy to receive a high 
criticality ranking along side a feasibility rating of not being feasible.  All other critical 
strategies were rated at “easily accomplished” or “feasible.”  Strategy 11 states the need 
to have cooperation with the media in portraying terrorists as murders and not freedom 
fighters or suicide bombers.  The contention is that the media is recognized as a tool of 
the terrorists and reducing the affect of media coverage would weaken the terrorists.  This 
is of course a hotbed of political debate among those more apt to be outside the realm of 
academic research and more likely to be among those who debate political strategy or 
correctness issues. 
Another unexpected finding is within the Technology Based subordinate category.  
All of the strategies were clustered in the Delta Level.   There are six strategies in all 
dealing with technologies such as gear to protect against chemical biological and nuclear 
exposure, software, automated cameras, electronic search equipment, and radioactive 
material detection equipment.  The common barrier to implementation among these 
strategies is cost.  These strategies also all ranked low on criticality among subject matter 
experts. 
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Finally, the researcher noticed areas for comparison between some of the strategies 
formulated in this study and the work done by Calhoun and Weston (2003).  In Calhoun 
and Weston’s work on threat management, they propose a process by which 
organizations can identify, investigate, and manage people who may be a threat to 
physically harm other people within the workplace (p. 1).    When establishing a threat 
management process, they posit specific criteria that must be in place for its 
development.  The various strategies and subordinate categories that have culminated 
from this study have profound similarities to their recommended criteria.   
The first task in Calhoun and Weston’s (2003) contemporary threat management 
process is to train employees in what to look for and how to respond.  The subordinate 
category of Training contains specific strategies that deal with the very same issues.  
Furthermore, Calhoun and Weston recommend reaching to other areas and organizations 
and developing lines of communication so that information and experiences can be 
shared (p.264).  The subordinate category Communications/ Liaison has been pointed out 
earlier to hold the highest importance among the subject matter experts.  In this study, the 
greatest need to reduce the chance of terror attack in the tourism industry is in strategies 
involving information sharing and communication among agencies, jurisdictions, 
businesses, and communities as evidenced by the largest number of strategies than any 
other subordinate category in this study.   
When Calhoun and Weston refer to anyone who is the subject of threats of violence, 
they refer to them as a target (p. 275).  One of the most profound yet simple strategies 
developed during this study is Strategy 42.  Ranked in the Alpha Level, it states, 
“Recognize you are a target.”  This is crucial in any organization before attempting to 
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develop a crisis management plan.  Along those same lines, Calhoun and Weston 
recommend portraying a protective image to the target.  This means keeping them 
informed, provide instructions, and maintaining a calm atmosphere (p. 275).  Not only 
does that involve communication to patrons through the use of signs and public 
announcements, but also by creating a visual image; appearing safe and vigilant with the 
use of specialized units employed at the venue.  A list of strategies to address this is 
found in the subordinate category Specialty Security Units. 
Summary of Results 
The subject matter expert panel was instructed to suggest, refine, and prioritize 
strategies that can be used by the tourism industry to reduce the propensity for terror 
attack.  The Delphi study resulted in fifty-four strategies.  To best describe the results, the 
expert panel ranked these strategies as to criticality and rated the strategies as to 
feasibility to implementation.  Using that data, the strategies were inserted into a 
criticality-feasibility matrix.  Each quadrant of the matrix was then labeled as to its 
priority level.  Then, the researcher was able to cluster individual strategies into 
subordinate categories, nine in total.  The expert panel also provided comments on each 
strategy regarding its strengths, weaknesses, and any barriers to implementation.  Thus in 
answer to the fourth research question, “What are the prototype guidelines to apply the 
solutions to the stated needs?” the final format presents the strategies listed by 
subordinate category in priority level and supported by subject matter expert comments 
regarding implementation. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the tourism industry in the United States has 
come to realize the threat of terror attack within this country’s borders must be 
considered plausible.  Yet, there is no set of guidelines to which the tourism industry can 
refer for assistance in devising strategies that may be common areas of concern among 
the various tourism sectors.   
This study identified the strategies that can reduce the propensity of terror attack 
directed at tourism venues.  These strategies were prioritized and placed into a format 
that describes potential impact and consequences to implementation to tourism risk 
management policy makers.  It expanded on the limited amount of research base to 
security officials and experts in the tourism field by correlating views and opinions of 
experts regarding terrorism risk management as to what are the important issues 
regarding tourism security.  The results are a list of strategies with assessment to 
criticality and feasibility. 
This study addressed the following the questions: 
1. What are the needs of the Tourism Industry to reduce the risk of terrorist attack? 
2. What are the solutions to the stated needs? 
3. What are the barriers to the stated solutions?  
4. What are the prototype guidelines to apply the solutions to the stated needs? 
This study followed the Delphi technique using three rounds of questionnaires 
distributed to an expert panel via electronic mail thus providing structure for the group 
 
   
   
85
process.  The Delphi technique thwarts the barrier of financial and time constraints 
associated with travel and allow geographically dispersed subject matter experts to 
participate from their respective locations (Linstone & Turoff, 1979). 
A core group of subject matter experts was gathered through a literature search, 
professional organization listings, and professional conference rosters.  The sample 
consisted of subject matter experts who matched the definition of an individual who has 
both academic and applied knowledge in the tourism security field.  Those in the core 
group were contacted and asked to nominate peers they believe to fit the criteria.  This 
resulted in a list of seventy-six experts including the original twelve from the core group.  
Twenty-four experts completed the round one questionnaire, twelve successfully 
completed round two and twelve participants successfully completed the round three 
questionnaires. 
Seventy-six tourism security experts were invited to participate in the study and were 
sent invitation via email on April 19, 2004.  The first round questionnaire provided an 
open-ended question seeking opinions from the expert panel.  The responses from all 
respondents were compiled into a comprehensive list of strategies that the experts 
proposed to reduce the propensity for terror attacks in the tourism industry.  The 
complete list of ideas from the first round was distributed in a second round questionnaire 
to the expert panel.  The panel was asked to further clarify each idea discussing its 
strengths and weaknesses and to rate the feasibility of each item and to state any barriers 
to implementing the particular strategy.  The third round asked the expert panel to rank 
the list of strategies from most critical to the least critical in regards to the effect that the 
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strategy will have in decreasing the chance of a terrorist attack.  The study was completed 
on February 10, 2005. 
The first research question addressed in this study was “What are the needs of the 
tourism industry to reduce the risk of terrorist attack?”  The first round questionnaire 
asked the panel of experts “What actions can be taken at events and locations (hotels, 
resorts, theme parks, convention centers, public gatherings, etc.) frequented by tourists 
that could reduce the propensity for terror attacks?”  The result was a comprehensive list 
of fifty-four strategies.   
The second research question to be addressed was “What are the solutions to the 
stated needs?”  The second round questionnaire, which included the comprehensive list 
of fifty-four strategies, was distributed to expert panel.  The panel was asked to review 
the list and provide for each strategy its strengths and weaknesses, a rating of its 
feasibility to implementation, and finally any barriers to implementation.  From this data, 
an average rating value for feasibility was calculated and implanted in the criticality-
feasibility matrix.   
The third research question to be addressed was “What are the barriers to the stated 
solutions?”  The descriptive data provided in the second round questionnaire on barriers 
to implementing each strategy was analyzed.  A format for considering strategy 
implementation began to emerge.   
In the final round, the expert panel was asked to rank the list of strategies from the 
most critical to the least critical.  The average rank order for criticality of each strategy 
was calculated.  This rank data was then used in conjunction with the feasibility rating 
data to complete the matrix, which clustered strategies according to their criticality 
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ranking and feasibility rating.  Each quadrant of the matrix was assigned a level 
designated by Alpha, Beta, Chi, and Delta.  Alpha level strategies are known to be of 
the highest criticality and the highest degree of feasibility, Beta level strategies are 
highly critical, but have a low degree of feasibility for implementation, the Chi level 
strategies are designated as having low criticality and are easily implemented, and 
finally, Delta level strategies are of a low critical nature and difficult to implement. 
Combining the priority levels with the stated barriers to implementation identified 
by the expert panel along with any stated strengths and weaknesses comprises the 
prototype guidelines that address the fourth research question of “What are the 
prototype guidelines to apply the solutions to the stated needs?”   
When working toward policy decisions, the objectives of a Delphi are a 
combination of discovering all possible options for consideration, estimates of impact 
and consequences of each option, and determine acceptability of any option.  The 
overall goal is not one of creating consensus as much as it is to expose all ideas and 
strategies and the pro and con arguments for each (Linstone & Turoff, 1979).  A list of 
fifty-four strategies was developed by this study.  Experts who gave opinions on 
strengths and weakness, acceptability, and its critical nature examined each strategy. 
Conclusions 
The data produced as a result of this descriptive study has led the researcher to the 
following conclusions. 
1. Strategy Number 2 received the highest criticality ranking over all other 
strategies and therefore should be highly considered by the tourism industry.  It involves 
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training first responders on their role in circumventing the success of terrorists following 
an attack.   
2. The subordinate category Communication/ Liaison contains the largest number 
of strategies indicating the significance of this category among experts.  Of the twelve 
strategies within this subordinate category, ten were ranked as highly critical.  No other 
subordinate category received this high number of strategies. 
3. The subordinate category to contain the second highest number of strategies is 
that of Specialty Security Units again indicating the importance of the topic among 
experts.  Half of the eight strategies were ranked as highly critical.   
4. All six strategies of the Technology Based subordinate category fell into the 
Delta level of priority, which is the lowest priority level showing that at this point, the 
experts do not believe that technology is the best tool to protect against terrorism in the 
tourism industry.  The common theme among these strategies is the cost barrier.  Finding 
ways to fund advanced technologies in order to make them more feasible to implement 
will be a challenge, however, the trade off in increased safety can justify the cost.   
5. Three strategies emerged in the Media Cooperation subordinate category 
demonstrating that the media is viewed as tool of the terrorist.  Though controlling the 
media could be effective, the expert panel was quick to point out that due to its 
unconstitutionality, it is not feasible.  Among the twenty-five strategies ranked as highly 
critical, Strategy 11 was the only strategy to receive a feasibility rating of “not feasible.”  
This topic opens the door to a lengthy political debate. 
6. Two Background Check strategies emerged as a subcategory, however Strategy 
16 involving backgrounds done on venue employees fell into the Alpha priority level 
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while Strategy 17 involving background checks done on contractors fell into the Delta 
priority level indicating the concern among experts that the contractors would fail to 
provide adequate background investigation practices in order to save on the additional 
overhead cost.  This is an opportunity for either the private or public sector to standardize 
backgrounds and research the most effective and efficient methods to conduct 
background checks for security purposes.  An accreditation process or entity could serve 
to streamline appropriate background practices which reduce time and cost. 
7. The six different strategies that appeared in the Architectural Design 
subordinate category expresses the experts’ opinion of the need for various types of 
functional designs for physical protection to include new construction and remodeling of 
existing venues.  Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design or CPTED has been 
expressed by the law enforcement community for many years, yet training in this area at 
the academic and professional levels seems slow to follow.  Designing a facility around 
security systems would be a much more effective method than installing security systems 
after the fact.  Even more expensive is the remodeling of a venue when a safety concern 
arises after completion of the facility. 
8. During the study, some SME’s who were invited to participate wanted 
recognition for their company while others declined to participate because they did not 
wish to divulge information or technologies that they regarded as trade secrets from 
which they stood to profit.  This is indicative of communication roadblocks afflicting this 
industry.   
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Recommendations 
The data discovered in this study are descriptive and should primarily be used as a 
reference during decision making by those operating in the tourism industry.  As a result 
of this study, the following recommendations are presented. 
Recommendations Based on the Study     
1. The guidelines developed in this study should be used by operators of tourism 
venues to make the best use of limited resources. 
2. National or international conferences should be established to further discuss 
these issues to include governmental entities such as the Homeland Security, Department 
of Defense, and F.B.I. as well as private sector organizations. 
3. A greater number of communications mediums should be established to 
facilitate the exchange of ideas and experiences between affected professionals.  This 
could also be extended to vendors to allow secure cross communication whereby 
presentation of available technologies could be accomplished more expediently and at a 
reduced cost.  An example would be a secure web net where presentations could be made 
without threat of infiltration. 
4. Insurance providers should use this information to establish validated guidelines 
so that if prospective clients adhered to the recommendations a reduction in premiums 
could be offered. 
5. Training should be implemented at the academic and professional levels for 
architects regarding facility designs that incorporate security features to guard against 
terror attack.  Designs from the ground up can also incorporate the aesthetic qualities 
desired by the customer.  Expenditures for new facilities with security design features 
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will be more cost effective than having to remodel at a later time after weaknesses are 
discovered. 
6. Table top exercises or scenario training that may be conducted by law 
enforcement entities should be expanded to include other affected organizations such as 
hotel operators, convention centers, private security forces, and other tourism related 
businesses. 
7. Other entities may benefit from this study, such as public school systems, the 
energy production industry, hospital systems, and pipeline systems should consider the 
information from this study.  There are more that could benefit from this study and only a 
few have been listed. 
Recommendations for Future Study     
1. Regarding the Technology Based subordinate category, a study should be 
conducted involving only technological strategies.  Though viewed in this study as 
mostly cost prohibitive, technology is a rapidly changing arena and in the future cost may 
be overcome as a barrier as the technologies improve. 
2. Over time, strategies, technologies, and tactics can change.  In order to stay 
abreast of a fluid environment, this study should be replicated or at least similar studies 
conducted so as to maintain updated information for the affected professionals. 
3. A more accessible validated background check system should be developed for 
contractors to be able to provide safe employees to customers in a cost effective manner. 
4. A predetermined list of strategies in future studies would speed up the process 
and possibly increase the number of participants.  Furthermore, a computer based study 
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with a multiple choice answer system that reduces the amount of time to participate may 
entice a larger pool of participants. 
5. Studies directed at determining the best environmental design practices 
regarding safety could be beneficial in many sectors within and outside the tourism 
industry. 
6. In future research, a close look should be taken as to developing better methods 
to rate feasibility of the strategies. 
7. An effort should be made to determine what can be done to make critical 
strategies more feasible for a larger cross section of the tourism industry. 
8. Data collection from interrogation of terrorists to determine if any factors exist 
that cause a change in plans are target selection.  If factors do exist, then strategies could 
be developed around that information. 
These recommendations are presented so that future studies can develop additional 
data from which to test the validity of these suggestions. 
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ROUND ONE 
INVITATION EMAIL 
Information Sheet 
Development of Prototype Guidelines for Risk Management Against Terror Attack in the 
tourism Industry 
You have been asked to participate in a research study being conducted at Texas A&M University 
regarding risk management in the tourism industry.  You were selected to be a participant because of your 
past experience, expertise, and general interest in the area of tourism security.  Your name was obtained 
through a literature search, professional organization listings, and professional conference rosters. The 
purpose of this study is to gather strategies and factors from tourism security professionals in order to 
formulate comments from which terrorism risk management policies can be developed.  There shall be an 
attempt to correlate views and opinions regarding terrorism risk management and to allow respondents to 
react to and examine opposing viewpoints.  The study shall put forth all possible options for consideration 
by individual, corporate, and agency policy makers.  To provide further detail, an estimate of impact and 
consequences of any particular option as well as examination of the acceptability of any particular option 
shall be sought.  The purpose of this study is NOT to make decisions for policy makers, but rather, to 
provide all available options presented by an informed group for consideration by policy makers. 
The Delphi methodology is a widely used technique for the systematic development of expert 
opinion consensus.  This methodology involves gathering data from a small group of persons who by 
professional reputation have been identified as “experts.”  If you agree to participate in this study, you will 
be asked to complete the following questionnaire as well as one or more subsequent questionnaires to be 
disseminated and returned via email, thus participating as a “panel expert.”   There shall be two or more 
questionnaires, but no more than four questionnaires in total.  Each questionnaire should take 
approximately 25 to 30 minutes to complete.  At the conclusion of the study, each participant shall receive 
a copy of the documented results.   
This study is confidential and any link between the participant’s identity and the data shall not be 
disclosed and destroyed at the conclusion of the study.  No identifiers linking you to the study will be 
included in any sort of report that might be published.   
By completing and returning this questionnaire, you agree to participate in this study.  This 
research study has been reviewed b the Institutional Review Board – Human Subjects in Research, Texas 
A&M University. You may withdrawal from this study at any time without negative consequences to 
anyone or Texas A&M University.  For research-related problems or questions regarding subjects’ rights, 
you can contact the institutional Review board through Dr. Michael W. Buckley, director of Research 
Compliance, Office of Vice President for Research at (979) 845-8585 (mwbuckley@tamu.edu). 
      Sincerely,  
       
      Keith Smith 
      Research Associate 
 
Clifford “Keith” Smith 
Department of Educational Administration 
and Human Development 
(979) 224-3342 
:  TexasAandM.PhDResearch@verizon.net 
Dr. Walter F. Stenning, Committee Chair 
Department of Educational Administration 
and Human Development 
(979) 845-8380 
wfs4666@tuxcom.net 
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ROUND ONE 
FIRST REMINDER 
From:  Keith Smith 
Date:  May 23, 2004 
Subject:  Round One Reminder 
My name is Keith Smith and I am conducting tourism security research at Texas A&M 
University as part of my doctoral studies.  You have been nominated by a colleague as a 
knowledgeable professional in the area of tourism security and suggested that I contact 
you for your valuable input.   
  
Below you will see the official information sheet approved by the university that 
describes the research study.  The study will be conducted via email for your convenience.  
It is my desire that the study provide useful information to the tourism industry and the 
results will be provided to the participants.  If you do not wish to participate in the study, 
an email notification would be appreciated. 
  
It would also be helpful if you could provide the names and contact information of ten 
other professionals you believe would have knowledge in this area and would provide 
input. 
  
Thank you very much for your time and participation, 
  
Keith Smith 
Research Associate, Texas A&M University 
College Station, Texas 
Phone:  979-224-3342 
Email:  TexasAandM.PhDResearch@verizon.net 
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ROUND ONE 
SECOND REMINDER 
From:  Keith Smith 
Date:  July 9, 2004 
Subject:  Round One Reminder 
I wrote to you a while ago regarding a Ph.D study that I am conducting at Texas A&M 
University. I would like to involve you in my research. I received your name from a 
fellow colleague.  Please let me know if you would be willing to participate. If you have 
any questions regarding the study please feel free to me. 
  
Thank you very much for your time and participation, 
  
Keith Smith 
Research Associate, Texas A&M University 
College Station, Texas 
Phone:  979-224-3342 
Email:  TexasAandM.PhDResearch@verizon.net 
 
   
   
102
ROUND ONE 
THIRD REMINDER 
From:  Keith Smith 
Date:  September 14, 2004 
Subject:  Round One Reminder 
I wrote to you a while ago regarding a Ph.D study that I am conducting at Texas A&M 
University. I would like to involve you in my research. I received your name from a 
fellow colleague.  Please let me know if you would be willing to participate. If you have 
any questions regarding the study please feel free to me. 
  
Thank you very much for your time and participation, 
  
Keith Smith 
Research Associate, Texas A&M University 
College Station, Texas 
Phone:  979-224-3342 
Email:  TexasAandM.PhDResearch@verizon.net 
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ROUND TWO 
INVITATION EMAIL 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to report all of the ideas sent in response to the first 
questionnaire and to solicit new ideas for dealing with the issue:  
What actions can be taken at events and locations frequented by 
tourists that could reduce the propensity for terror attacks? 
Please further refine these ideas by providing additional clarification where desired and 
by listing additional strengths and weaknesses you associate with each.   Common themes 
or ideas have been grouped together.  Also, rate each idea as to its feasibility and 
comment as to why the idea is feasible or not.  Please list any new ideas at the bottom of 
the questionnaire and comment on each new idea’s strengths and weaknesses for 
addressing the issue.  After receiving all participants’ responses to this questionnaire, I 
will provide you with the results.  Then a final questionnaire will be provided in which to 
assign votes for five ideas you feel will best deal with the issue. All votes will be tallied 
and results sent to participants. Your ideas will be anonymously included in the next 
report.  For statistical purposes, please provide the number of years of combined 
experience in Tourism/ Security/ Law Enforcement: ______ yrs. 
  
Thank you very much for your time and participation, 
  
Keith Smith 
Research Associate, Texas A&M University 
College Station, Texas 
Phone:  979-224-3342 
Email:  TexasAandM.PhDResearch@verizon.net 
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ROUND TWO REMINDER 
From:  Keith Smith 
Date:  December 2, 2004 
Subject:  Round Two Reminder 
Thank you so much for participating in my study.  I began the process in April and have 
now received the number of required responses to move into phase 2.  I appreciate your 
efforts and hope to obtain responses from this second request in a timely manner so that 
we will be able to disseminate the final questionnaire.  It is my hopes to wrap up the data 
collection and provide the results to the participants very quickly, but of course I am 
dependant upon the responses I receive.  Thanks once again and please email me if you 
have any questions.. 
  
Thank you very much for your time and participation, 
  
Keith Smith 
Research Associate, Texas A&M University 
College Station, Texas 
Phone:  979-224-3342 
Email:  TexasAandM.PhDResearch@verizon.net 
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ROUND THREE 
INVITATION EMAIL 
The purpose of this study is to elicit your ideas regarding the following issue:  
What actions can be taken at events and locations (Hotels, Resorts, 
Theme Parks, Convention Centers, public gatherings, etc.) frequented 
by tourists that could reduce the propensity for terror attacks? 
The purpose of this final questionnaire is to rank all of the ideas from the previous 
questionnaires in order of the most critical to the least critical regarding the effect each 
idea will have against a terror attack.  Below is a list of the ideas that were generated in 
the previous rounds of the study.  The list is in no particular order.  Please rearrange them 
in order from top to bottom with regards to your professional opinion as to which idea is 
the most critical in reducing the propensity of a terror attack.  At the bottom of the list 
should be the idea that in your professional opinion is the least critical action to take in 
reducing the propensity of a terror attack.  
  
Thank you very much for your time and participation, 
  
Keith Smith 
Research Associate, Texas A&M University 
College Station, Texas 
Phone:  979-224-3342 
Email:  TexasAandM.PhDResearch@verizon.net 
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ROUND THREE REMINDER 
From:  Keith Smith 
Date:  February 1, 2004 
Subject:  Round Three Reminder 
Thank you so much for participating in my study.  I began the process in April I 
appreciate your efforts and hope to obtain responses from this third round in a timely 
manner so that we will be able to complete the research.  It is my hopes to wrap up the 
data collection and provide the results to the participants very quickly, but of course I am 
dependant upon the responses I receive.  This is the last round and I won't have to ask for 
any more of your time.  I can't tell you how much I appreciate your time. 
 
Thank you very much for your time and participation, 
 
Keith Smith 
Research Associate, Texas A&M University 
College Station, Texas 
Phone:  979-224-3342 
Email:  TexasAandM.PhDResearch@verizon.net 
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APPENDIX B 
ROUND ONE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
 
   
   
108
Round #1 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to elicit your ideas regarding the following issue:  
What actions can be taken at events and locations (Hotels, Resorts, 
Theme Parks, Convention Centers, public gatherings, etc.) frequented 
by tourists that could reduce the propensity for terror attacks? 
Please list each idea in a brief, concise manner and email your response to me. Your ideas 
need not be fully developed. In fact, it is preferable to have each idea expressed in one 
brief sentence or phrase. Ideas may cover the gamut from hiring practices to 
implementation of security devices to the amount of cooperation with local law 
enforcement.  No attempt should be made to evaluate or justify these ideas at this point in 
time. Your ideas will be anonymously included in the next questionnaire. 
Idea #1: 
Idea #2: 
Idea #3: 
Idea #4: 
Idea #5: 
Idea #6: 
Idea #7: 
Idea #8: 
Idea #9: 
Idea #10: 
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APPENDIX C 
ROUND TWO RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
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Round #2 
Idea #1 Terrorism only works due to media.  National government needs to  
have agreements with media regarding a terrorist attack; much the same way  
they control war footage. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
Idea #2 Additional training provided to teach first responders about terrorist goals and 
their role in limiting the success of a terrorist attack (i.e. what to do after the scene  
is stabilized). 
 
 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
 
   
   
111
Idea #3 Make non-vital targets more readily available in order to channel terrorist  
activity to those locations.  Ensure non-vital targets are politically acceptable. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #4 Publicize as many events as possible being multi-national.   
Tourism must be advertised for success.  Use of in place marketing systems  
to stress diversity will create additional considerations for terrorist in  
planning an attack.  They don't want the French after them. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
 
Idea #5 Train event and safety specialist in dynamic as opposed to static  
security techniques.  Utilize diverse and randomized methods for screening  
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tourists upon entry to an event and for controlling crowd flow during an  
event.  Where warranted bag, purse and package checks of guests, participates, invitees 
and employees; combine assertive measures including inspecting packages, etc but 
combine those with exceptional customer service empowerment; Bag check stands at 
entrances to parks and conventions. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #6 In line with dynamic techniques, make heavy use of a double  
entrance approach.  It will be difficult for terrorist to breach if they are  
unsure what measures will be in place after the initial entrance.  Any  
persons attempting to leave after the first entrance and before the second  
entrance would be considered suspect; Designing increasing layers of security around an 
event based upon a risk assessment; Control entrance and egress to and from large events, 
to include vehicular and pedestrian.  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
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What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Ideas #7 Improve physical design of facilities to take into account the terrorist threat; 
DESIGN new facilities with crime prevention in mind; REMODEL 
existing facilities with crime prevention in mind. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #8 Have a unified method to determine risks. 
 
 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
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What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #9 Reaching out to the community for intelligence.  The police have had great 
success with crime solvers programs and some type of program for voluntary 
participation in intelligence would be of value. 
Establish communication between hotels, parks, and other events with local and federal 
law enforcement.  We have set up an e-mail notification system to distribute flyers and 
lookouts to the hotels, malls and apartment complexes. 
 
 
We have for years established a fax system to distribute information to the hotels and 
theme parks.  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #10 Having community leaders speak in a unified voice against terrorism.  This 
would be especially true of community leaders in the religious communities since most 
recent acts of terrorism are based on some slanted view of religion. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
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• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
Idea #11 Ask the media's cooperation in correctly portraying these people.  They are not 
suicide bombers but homicide bombers, they are not freedom fighters but murderers, and 
they are not to be admired but scorned. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #12 Network with other communities to determine what programs have found 
success in combating this problem.    
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
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1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #13 Implement a crisis management plan. 
The first step is to determine what areas of your property or event are 
vulnerable; evaluate probability and seriousness and then develop a plan to 
prevent and/or respond if a threat or event occurs.    
Conduct threat assessments for special events and structures to include integrated 
response plans involving private and public first responders. 
 
 
Start with vulnerability assessments- physical structure and threat assessment- real or 
perceived  
Plan, plan and then review the plan...then plan and evaluate some more. 
(never feel that you are totally prepared and never feel that you have 
thought of everything and can not improve on the plan or training). 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
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Idea #14 Improve intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing capabilities among private 
and public security professionals. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #15 Where applicable personal screening of guests, participates, invitees and 
employees should be conducted.    
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
Idea #16 Back ground checks conducted on each employee; Proper pre-hiring 
background and credit checks.  Not just any background, but PROPER background 
checks.  Ask for more details. 
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• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #17 Outside contractors for the event or location should have backgrounds 
conducted by the contractor. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #18 All employees should have identifying Id’s and/or tags. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
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• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #19 All working contractors should be provided with a contractor’s Id tag or badge. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
  
Idea #20 All employees should come through Security check point and verified that they 
are an active employee. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
 
   
   
120
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
  
Idea #21 All contractors should have a specific parking area and be subject to vehicle 
screening by Security personnel. 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #22 Frequent and high profile public service announcements regarding auspicious 
activities in or near venue, i.e. citizens should maintain control of their belongings. 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
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1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #23 Implement the utilization of closed circuit television in tourist areas; Equip 
venue and core surrounding area with CCTV or microwave surveillance capabilities. 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #24 Deployment of plainclothes law enforcement personnel to detect and obtain 
critical information from within the crowds.  Personnel can be used for intelligence 
gathering and counter surveillance engagement; Deploy special plain-clothes officers to 
monitor activity at event; have unmarked security guards; Utilization of undercover 
operatives to gather and disseminate intelligence information both in a strategic and 
tactical capacity. 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
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• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #25 Utilization of special units that provide visibility along with confidence to 
visitors (Examples: Bike patrols, Mounted Units, Motorcycle Units). 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #26 Increase cooperative effort/commitment with federal, state and municipal 
entities. 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
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1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #27 Train personnel (both police and private sector) in recognizing potential threats 
and actions that warrant police intervention. 
  
Provide training to all employees involved in events or tourism venues relating to 
preoperational surveillance techniques, signs and signatures relating to operational 
rehearsals, and actions to take when suspicions are raised. 
  
Educate staff using local law enforcement. 
  
TELL your staff to be aware. Don't fall into a comfortable 
daze because nothing ever happens. 
  
Training- I have developed a training program for hotels that empowers every employee 
to be a security agent.  Each job category (valet, bell stand, front desk, housekeeping, 
engineering....) is given things to look for when handling their guests.  When something 
isn't quite right, they contact their security department or call 911 immediately.  It gives 
the employees a sense of involvement in this nations Homeland Security effort.  
  
Train ALL facility employees to recognize and report suspicious activity. 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
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Idea #28 Train, equip and staff police personnel with CBRNE gear. 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #29 Target-harden venues to include metal detectors.  
 
 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
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Idea #30 Stage specially trained law enforcement personnel for bomb intervention near 
the venue; Train, staff and deploy personnel in bomb detection/suppression.  Deploy 
mechanical bomb detection devices with police and private sector security staff. 
 
 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #31 Fund, budget and deploy AIR Unit support to monitor event. 
 
 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
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Idea #32 Billboards with directions about what to do if a crisis occurs;  SIGN everything; 
People should always know where they are and where they are going or where they need 
to go. 
 
 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #33 Implement the utilization of face recognition software in tourist areas. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
 
   
   
127
Idea #34 High visibility of Security personnel and/or Law Enforcement personnel; 
Have clothed security guards wandering around; Utilization of High Visibility 
Uniformed security and/or law enforcement personnel in tourist areas;  
High visibility of uniformed staff; Heavy police presence in tourism areas keeps most 
problems away to begin with. 
  
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #35 Enhance security procedures to include the use of manual and electronic 
search methods.  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
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Idea #36 Utilization of Citizen Patrols that have been specifically trained using the 
Citizen Emergency Response Training model 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #37 PLAN with the local police department. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
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Idea #38: ASK your guests to be aware. Don't scare them, tell them 
their stay will be more enjoyable if they are aware of their 
surroundings and take simple precautions to keep them and their stuff 
safe. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #39: PARTNER with the media to publish safety tips and location 
maps. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
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Idea #40: Available K-9; Use of trained dogs to detect contraband; K9 assistance – 
bomb dogs. 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #41: Regular drills to prevent skill decay; Train and retrain. 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #42: Recognize you are a target 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
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• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #43: Tighten up loading dock operations at large venues; Only allow access to those 
on check lists; SOPs for delivery, Any and all delivery vehicles should be recorded and 
Driver’s license should be recorded when making deliveries.   
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
  
Idea #44: Have regularly scheduled meetings with area venues to keep them up with 
changing trends in security and to allow them a voice to express their concerns.  
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
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• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #45: Local law enforcement should become involved in organizations and serve on 
boards when appropriate or when asked to do so. (Hotel and lodging associations, 
convention and visitors bureaus, chamber of commerce, etc.) 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #46: Barricades placed to prevent vehicle intrusion; Concrete Barriers and Spike 
Strips, keep vehicles at a distance from the perimeter; control of vehicular traffic; combat 
VBIEDs (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device). 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
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• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #47   Cross communication with local and fed law enforcement on updated terrorist 
intelligence. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #48 Off-hour perimeter security (gates, fences, patrols); All outer perimeters should 
be patrolled on a regular unscheduled time span.    
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
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• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #49 Ongoing training for security personnel on terrorists activity / tactics. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #50 Cameras with a big screen picture of people walking in and around specifically 
strategic areas of interest – do you see how fast you are driving.  
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
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1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #51 Photo identification, and personalized security devices (cards, bracelets, etc.) 
for patrons. 
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
  
Idea #52 Motion detectors that are voice activated and state something to the effect that 
the premises are under law enforcement surveillance.  
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
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1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #53 Advanced reservations required to access vital places. Scan cards were mailed 
to allow access to the event. 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
Idea #54 Use radioactive material detection devices throughout facilities or event areas. 
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
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be Implemented accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
  
  
      
  
New Idea:  
  
• Your clarification (if any): 
• Strengths: 
• Weaknesses: 
• Feasibility:   
1 2 3 4 
Not Likely to 
be Implemented
Not Feasible Feasible Easily 
accomplished 
  
What are the barriers to implementing the solution: 
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APPENDIX D 
ROUND THREE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
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ROUND #3 
The purpose of this final questionnaire is to rank all of the ideas from the previous 
questionnaires in order of the most critical to the least critical regarding the effect each 
idea will have against a terror attack.  Below is a list of the ideas that were generated in 
the previous rounds of the study.  The list is in no particular order.  Please rearrange them 
in order from top to bottom with regards to your professional opinion as to which idea is 
the most critical in reducing the propensity of a terror attack.  At the bottom of the list 
should be the idea that in your professional opinion is the least critical action to take in 
reducing the propensity of a terror attack.  
 
 
 All working contractors should be provided with a 
contractor’s Id tag or badge. 
 All employees should come through security check point 
and verified that they are an active employee. 
 Improve physical design of facilities to take into account 
the terrorist threat.  Design new facilities with crime 
prevention in mind.  Remodel existing facilities with 
crime prevention in mind. 
 Have a unified method to determine risks. 
 Reach out to the community for intelligence.  Establish 
communication between hotels, parks, and other events 
with local and federal law enforcement. 
 Network with other communities to determine what 
programs have bee successful in combating terrorism. 
 Terrorism only works due to media.  National government 
needs to have agreements with media regarding a terrorist 
attack; much the same way they control war footage. 
 Additional training provided to teach first responders 
about terrorist goals and their role in limiting the success 
of a terrorist attack (i.e. what to do after the scene is 
stabilized). 
 Make non-vital targets more readily available in order to 
channel terrorist activity to those locations.  Ensure non-
vital targets are politically acceptable. 
 Implement a crisis management plan.  Conduct threat 
assessments for special events and structures to include 
integrated response plans involving private and public 
first responders. 
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 Improve intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing 
capabilities among private and public security 
professionals. 
 Where applicable, personal screening of guests, 
participates, invitees, and employees should be 
conducted. 
 Conduct thorough background and credit checks on each 
employee. 
 Outside contractors for the event or location should have 
backgrounds conducted on own employees by third party. 
 All employees should have identifying badges and/or 
tags. 
 All contractors should have a specific parking area and be 
subject to vehicle screening by security personnel. 
 Frequent and high profile public service announcements 
regarding suspicious activities in or near venue, i.e. 
patrons should maintain control of their belongings. 
 Deploy plainclothes law enforcement personnel to detect 
and obtain critical information from within the crowds.  
Personnel can be used for intelligence gathering and 
counter surveillance engagement. 
 Utilize special security units that provide confidence to 
visitors (Examples: Bike patrols, Mounted Units, 
Motorcycle Units). 
 Having community leaders, including religious leaders, 
speak out in a unified voice against terrorism since most 
recent acts of terrorism are based on some slanted view of 
religion. 
 Ask the media's cooperation in correctly portraying these 
people.  They are not suicide bombers, but homicide 
bombers, they are not freedom fighters, but murderers, 
and they are not to be admired, but scorned. 
 Increase cooperative effort/ commitment with federal, 
state and municipal entities. 
 Implement the utilization of closed circuit television in 
tourist areas at venue and core surrounding area. 
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 Design increasing layers of security around an event 
based upon a risk assessment.  In line with dynamic 
techniques, make heavy use of a double entrance 
approach; it will be difficult for terrorists to breach if they 
are unsure what measures will be in place after the initial 
entrance.  Any persons attempting to leave after the first 
entrance and before the second entrance would be 
considered suspect. 
 Train, equip, and staff police personnel with CBRNE 
gear. 
 Target-harden venues to include metal detectors. 
 Utilize off-hour perimeter security patrols at gates and 
fences.  All outer perimeters should be patrolled on a 
regular unscheduled time span. 
 Stage specially trained law enforcement personnel for 
bomb intervention near the venue.  Train staff and deploy 
personnel in bomb detection/suppression.  Deploy 
mechanical bomb detection devices with police and 
private sector security staff. 
 Employ cameras with a big screen picture of people 
walking in and around specific strategic areas of interest.  
Similar to radar trailers; “Do you see how fast you are 
driving?” 
 Fund, budget, and deploy air unit support to monitor 
event. 
 Billboards with instructions on what to do if a crisis 
occurs. People should always know where they are and 
where they are going or where they need to go. 
 Implement the utilization of face recognition software in 
tourist areas. 
 High visibility of law enforcement personnel for a 
deterrent aspect. 
 Enhance security procedures to include the use of manual 
and electronic search methods. 
 Utilize citizen patrols that have been specifically trained 
to enhance security or law enforcement. 
 Plan with the local police department. 
 Provide ongoing training for security personnel on 
terrorists’ activity and tactics. 
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 Use photo identification and personalized security devices 
(i.e. ID cards, bracelets, etc.) for patrons. 
 Install motion detectors that are voice activated and state 
something to the effect that the premise is under law 
enforcement surveillance. 
 Ask your guests to be aware. Don't scare them.  Tell them 
their stay will be more enjoyable if they are aware of their 
surroundings and take simple precautions to keep them 
and their belongings safe. 
 Partner with the media to publish safety tips and location 
maps. 
 Use training drills to prevent skill decay.  Train and 
retrain. 
 Recognize you (tourism venue) are a target. 
 Tighten-up security at loading dock operations at large 
venues.  Only allow access to those on check lists.  
Implement standard operating procedures for delivery. 
Any and all delivery vehicles should be recorded and 
driver’s license should be recorded. 
 Have regularly scheduled meetings with area venues to 
keep them informed of changing trends in security and to 
allow them a voice to express their concerns. 
 Local law enforcement should become involved in 
organizations and serve on boards when appropriate or 
when asked to do so; i.e. hotel and lodging associations, 
convention and visitors bureaus, chamber of commerce, 
etc. 
 Use barricades to prevent vehicular intrusion.  Employ 
concrete barriers and spike strips.  Keep vehicles at a 
distance from the perimeter. 
 Cross communicate with local and fed law enforcement 
on updated terrorist intelligence. 
 Use of trained dogs to detect weapons/ contraband.  
Deploy K9 units to assist in bomb detection. 
 Use radioactive material detection devices throughout 
facilities or event areas. 
 Require advanced reservations to access vital places. Scan 
cards are mailed to allow access to the event. 
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